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While Bangladesh has experienced steady advances in food
production through the adoption of agricultural technologies,
chronic food insecurity remains a challenge. Similar to other
countries in South Asia, there is a strong gender dimension
to food insecurity and malnutrition in Bangladesh. In South
Asia, the low status of women and gender gaps in health
and education contribute to chronic child malnutrition
(Smith, Ramakrishnan, Ndiaye, Haddad, & Martorell, 2003)
and food insecurity (von Grebmer et al., 2009), even as other
determinants of food security, such as per capita incomes,
have improved. Renewed interest in agriculture as an engine
of inclusive growth and speciﬁcally in women’s empowerment
has highlighted the need to develop indicators for measuring
women’s empowerment, to examine its relationship to various
food security outcomes, and to monitor the impact of inter-
ventions to empower women.
This paper presents how the recently developed Women’s
Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) (Alkire et al.,
2013) can be used to assess the extent of women’s empowerment
in agriculture, diagnose areaswhere gaps in empowerment exist,
and examine the extent to which improvements in the underly-
ing indicators in these areas can improve food security in rural
Bangladesh. The WEAI is a new survey-based index that uses
individual-level data collected from primary male and female
respondents within the same households, and is similar in
construction to the Alkire and Foster (2011) group of multi-
dimensional poverty indices.
Although it was initially developed as a monitoring and
evaluation tool for the US Government’s Feed the Future
programs, the WEAI has broader applicability as a diagnostic
tool for policymakers, development organizations, and aca-
demics seeking to inform eﬀorts to increase women’s empow-
erment. The WEAI was developed and tested during 2011–12
using three country pilots in Bangladesh, Guatemala, and
Uganda (Alkire et al., 2013); this paper will represent the ﬁrst
time it is being calculated using a nationally representative
survey.
Usingnationally representativedata from the 2012Bangladesh
Integrated Household Survey (BIHS) conducted by the11International Food Policy Research Institute, this paper exam-
ines the relationship betweenwomen’s empowerment in agricul-
ture and threemeasures of food security in ruralBangladesh, per
capita calorie availability, household dietary diversity, and
adult body mass index (BMI). We use six measures of women’s
empowerment—the aggregate women’s empowerment score,
based on the ﬁve domains of empowerment in agriculture
(5DE)—as well as four individual indicators derived by decom-
posing the 5DE to identify in which of the ﬁve domains disem-
powerment is most acute, and using the speciﬁc indicators
that comprise those domains. Our sixth measure, women’s
empowerment relative to men, is reﬂected by another compo-
nent of the WEAI, the gender parity gap. Because empower-
ment itself is endogenous, we use instrumental variables (IV)
regression to examine the relationship between various mea-
sures of women’s empowerment and measures of household
food security.
Increases in women’s empowerment scores are found to
increase both calorie availability and household dietary diver-
sity. Empowerment gaps for women in rural Bangladesh are
found to be greatest in terms of leadership in the community
and control and access to resources. Analyzing these two
12 WORLD DEVELOPMENTdomains further in terms of their component indicators, we
ﬁnd that the number of groups in which women actively par-
ticipate and women’s greater control of assets are positively
associated with both food security outcomes. Narrowing the
gap in empowerment between men and women within house-
holds is also positively associated with calorie availability and
household dietary diversity, consistent with the growing liter-
ature arguing that reducing intrahousehold gender inequality
contributes positively to household welfare. Most of the indi-
cators for women’s empowerment do not have any signiﬁcant
impact on adult BMI, suggesting that other factors, such as
household wealth, education, and occupation, are more
important determinants of adult male and female nutritional
status. However, women’s group membership and decision-
making concerning credit are negatively and signiﬁcantly asso-
ciated with adult male BMI, suggesting possible trade-oﬀs
within the household. The impacts of women’s empowerment
appear to vary by household wealth, as proxied by the size of
owned land. Our results suggest that the positive eﬀect of the
diﬀerent dimensions of female empowerment on food security
outcomes is greater for smaller landowners, that is, for less
well-oﬀ households, pointing to the potential positive redis-
tributive eﬀect of focusing women’s empowerment eﬀorts on
poorer households.2. BACKGROUND
(a) Agriculture, women’s empowerment, and food security
Agriculture is closely linked to food security, by providing a
source of food and nutrients, a broad-based source of income,
and by directly inﬂuencing food prices (Arimond et al., 2010).
Women account for 43% of the agricultural labor force in
developing countries (FAO, 2011a); yet considerable gender
bias exists in the agricultural sector, both in terms of quantities
of assets, agricultural inputs and resources that women control
(see Agarwal, 1994 on land in South Asia; Deere, Oduro,
Swaminathan, & Doss, 2013 on assets; and Peterman,
Behrman, & Quisumbing, 2010 on nonland inputs), as well
as returns to those inputs (Kilic, Palacios-Lopez, &
Goldstein, 2013). Similar to the recognition of women’s contri-
bution to agriculture worldwide, women’s role in Bangladeshi
agriculture tends to be underappreciated, owing to the com-
monly held view that women are not involved in agricultural
production, especially outside the homestead, because of cul-
tural norms that value female seclusion and undervalue female
labor (Kabeer, 1994; Rahman, 2000). Nevertheless, participa-
tion of women in the agricultural sector has increased over
time (Asaduzzaman, 2010, citing Bangladesh Bureau of Statis-
tics, various years). During 1999–2000 and 2005–06, the num-
ber of employed persons in agriculture increased from 19.99 to
22.93 million—about 15%. For male labor, there has been an
absolute decrease of about 6%, while for females the number
has increased from 3.76 to 7.71 million—that is, by more than
100%. As a result of such changes, the proportion of women in
the agricultural labor force has increased from less than 20%
to 33.6% of the total. This is indeed a phenomenal change,
although it is not yet clear how much of this change resulted
from a true secular increase as opposed to better measurement
of women’s participation.
Women in poor households, who are at greater risk of being
food-insecure, are more likely to be involved in the agricul-
tural sector, particularly as wage laborers, because women’s
earnings are important to their families’ subsistence. Zaman
(1995) provides evidence that the gender division of labor inagriculture is not as strictly demarcated as assumed, with
women being involved in agricultural work both inside and
outside the household. Rahman (2010) shows that female agri-
cultural labor contributes signiﬁcantly to productivity as well
as technical eﬃciency, but ﬁnds, similar to Zaman (1995), that
gender bias exists in the agricultural labor market. Remuner-
ative employment of labor remains skewed in favor of men,
since female labor is engaged only when the male labor supply
is exhausted.
Women’s ability to generate income in the agricultural sec-
tor is severely constrained by their limited use, ownership, and
control of productive physical and human capital. Banglade-
shi women are disadvantaged relative to men with respect to
assets brought to marriage (Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2003),
current productive assets (including land, livestock, and agri-
cultural machinery) (Quisumbing, Roy, Njuki, Tanvin, &
Waithanji, 2013), and human capital. Women lag behind in
terms of education in Bangladesh—with more than one in
three women having no schooling, compared to one in four
men. A recent analysis also showed that lack of education in
adult women in Bangladesh is a strong correlate of being
“ultra-poor”: 80% of adult women with no education live
below half a dollar a day (Ahmed, Hill, Smith, Wiesmann,
& Frankenberger, 2007).
The rationale for paying attention to gender inequality in
agriculture is rooted in a body of empirical evidence that dem-
onstrates the ways in which women are essential to improve-
ments in household agricultural productivity, food security,
and nutrition security. Considerable evidence exists that
households do not act in a unitary manner when making deci-
sions or allocating resources (Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad,
Hoddinott, & Kanbur, 1995; Haddad, Hoddinott, &
Alderman, 1997). This means that men and women within
households do not always have the same preferences nor pool
their resources. The nonpooling of agricultural resources
within the household creates a gender gap in control of agri-
cultural inputs, which has important implications for produc-
tivity. Several empirical studies have found that redistributing
inputs between men and women in the household has the
potential for increasing productivity (Kilic et al., 2013;
Peterman et al., 2010; Udry, Hoddinott, Alderman, &
Haddad, 1995). A growing body of empirical evidence
suggests that increasing women’s control over resources has
positive eﬀects on a number of important development
outcomes. For Coˆte d’Ivoire, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995)
and Duﬂo and Udry (2004) ﬁnd that increasing women’s share
of cash income signiﬁcantly increases the share of household
budget allocated to food. Doss (2006) shows that, in Ghana,
women’s share of assets, particularly farmland, signiﬁcantly
increases budget shares on food expenditure.
Considerable evidence also suggests that mothers’ greater
control over resources improves child outcomes—in particu-
lar, nutrition and education (Hallman, 2003; Quisumbing,
2003; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2003; Skouﬁas, 2005).
Although much of the abovementioned evidence has emerged
from observational studies, a systematic review of programs
targeting transfers to women (Yoong, Rabinovich, &
Diepeveen, 2012) has found that these improve children’s
well-being, especially in the form of investments in children’s
health and education.
The linkages between women’s empowerment and food secu-
rity have been more diﬃcult to quantify owing to the diﬃculty
of measuring empowerment. Despite these diﬃculties, there is
evidence that disempowerment in one of its most extreme
forms—being a victim of intimate partner violence (IPV)—is
associated with poor nutritional outcomes both for children
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data from the 2007 Bangladesh Demographic and Health Sur-
vey (BDHS), investigate the association between women’s
exposure to IPV and their children’s nutritional status. Of
2,042 women in the BDHS survey with at least one child under
5 years of age, 49.4% reported lifetime experience of physical
partner violence, while 18.4% reported experience of sexual
partner violence. They ﬁnd that women were more likely to
have a stunted child if they had lifetime experience of physical
IPV or had been exposed to sexual IPV. A study based on a
longitudinal dataset following up three sites in Bangladesh
where agricultural technologies had been introduced found
that experience of domestic abuse (particularly verbal abuse)
had a signiﬁcant negative impact on women’s current BMI
and on improvements in BMI over time (Quisumbing,
Bhagowalia, Menon, & Soundararajan, 2009).
Current eﬀorts to deﬁne and measure empowerment have
drawn heavily on Kabeer’s (1999) deﬁnition of empowerment
as expanding people’s ability to make strategic life choices,
particularly in contexts in which this ability had been denied
to them. In Kabeer’s deﬁnition, the ability to exercise choice
encompasses three dimensions: resources, agency, and
achievements (well-being outcomes). The WEAI focuses on
the “agency” aspect, which is far less studied than resources
such as income, or achievements such as educational levels.
Moreover, while nationally representative surveys such as
some demographic and health surveys (DHS) include a range
of questions about decisionmaking within the household, these
are typically conﬁned to the domestic sphere and do not
encompass decisions in the productive and economic spheres,
nor do the surveys have identical questions for men and
women (Alkire et al., 2013). The WEAI also departs from pre-
vious measures of women’s empowerment in that it captures
control over resources or agency within the agricultural sector,
something which existing indices have not done.
(b) Measuring women’s empowerment using the WEAI
The WEAI is an aggregate index, reported at the country or
regional level, which is based on individual-level data on menTable 1. The ﬁve domains of e
Domain Indicator
Production Input in productive decisions Sole or joint de
livestock, and ﬁ
Autonomy in production Autonomy in a
grow, what live
respondent’s m
rather than a d
Resources Ownership of assets Sole or joint ow
Purchase, sale, or transfer of assets Whether respon
his/her owned a
Access to and decisions on credit Access to and p
Income Control over use of income Sole or joint co
Leadership Group member Whether respon
social group (e.
Speaking in public Whether the res
various issues s
payment of wag
Time Workload Allocation of ti
Leisure Satisfaction wit
Source: Alkire et al. (2013).and women within the same households. The WEAI is a
weighted average of two sub-indexes: (1) the ﬁve domains of
women’s empowerment (5DE) and (2) gender parity (the Gen-
der Parity Index, GPI). 1 The 5DE sub-index shows how
empowered women are, capturing the roles and extent of
women’s engagement in the agricultural sector in ﬁve domains:
(1) decisions over agricultural production, (2) access to and
decisionmaking power over productive resources, (3) control
over use of income, (4) leadership in the community, and (5)
time use. Table 1 describes the ﬁve domains and their corre-
sponding ten indicators. The 5DE assesses the degree to which
women are empowered in these domains, and for those who
are not empowered, the percentage of domains in which they
are empowered. “Empowerment” within a domain means that
the person has adequate achievements or has “achieved ade-
quacy” for that domain (speciﬁc thresholds used to determine
whether a person has adequate achievements will be discussed
subsequently). Because the survey method goes beyond the
traditional practice of interviewing only a household “head”
(often a male) to interview both a principal male and principal
female, 5DE measures can be computed for both the principal
male and the principal female in a dual-adult household,
although the 5DE component of the WEAI only includes
women’s 5DE. Computation of men’s 5DE scores and their
comparison to women’s 5DE enables the comparison of the
agricultural empowerment of men and women living in the
same household. This comparison is embodied in the GPI
(gender parity index), a relative inequality measure that
reﬂects the inequality in 5DE proﬁles between the primary
adult male and female in each household. The aggregate
WEAI uses the mean GPI value of dual-adult households.
GPI combines two key pieces of information: (1) the percent-
age of women who lack gender parity relative to their male-
household counterparts and (2) the extent of the inequality
in empowerment between those women who lack parity and
the men with whom they live (see Alkire et al., 2013 for
details).
Both measures, taken together, make up the WEAI. 2 The
aggregate index therefore shows the degree to which women
are empowered in their households and communities (5DE)mpowerment in the WEAI
Deﬁnition of indicator Weight
cisionmaking over food and cash-crop farming,
sheries
1/10
gricultural production (e.g., what inputs to buy, crops to
stock to raise, etc.). Reﬂects the extent to which the
otivation for decisionmaking reﬂects his/her values
esire to please others or avoid harm.
1/10
nership of major household assets 1/15
dent participates in decision to buy, sell, or transfer
ssets
1/15
articipation in decisionmaking concerning credit 1/15
ntrol over income and expenditures 1/5
dent is an active member in at least one economic or
g., agricultural marketing, credit, water users’ groups)
1/10
pondent is comfortable speaking in public concerning
uch as intervening in a family dispute, ensure proper
es for public work programs, etc.
1/10
me to productive and domestic tasks 1/10
h the available time for leisure activities 1/10
14 WORLD DEVELOPMENTand the degree of inequality between women and men in their
households (GPI). Details regarding the construction and
validation of the index can be found in Alkire et al. (2013).
In this paper, we use individual measures of (women’s) 5DE
and its component indicators to investigate the relationship
between women’s empowerment in agriculture and food
security; additionally, we examine the relationship between
inequality in empowerment and food security in dual-adult
households using the gender parity gap, a component of
the GPI.3. DATA, EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS, AND
VARIABLES
(a) Data
The Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey (BIHS) was
designed and supervised by researchers at the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), including the authors
of this paper, and conducted from December 2011 to March
2012. The BIHS sample is nationally representative of rural
Bangladesh and representative of rural areas of each of the
seven administrative divisions of the country. To estimate
the total sample size of 5,503 households in 275 primary sam-
pling units (PSUs), BIHS followed a stratiﬁed sampling design
in two stages—selection of PSUs and selection of households
within each PSU—using the sampling frame developed from
the community series of the 2001 population census. In the
ﬁrst stage, a total sample of 275 PSUs were allocated among
the seven strata (seven divisions) with probability proportional
to the number of households in each stratum. Sampling
weights were adjusted using the sampling frame of the 2011
population census.
The BIHS questionnaires include several modules that pro-
vide an integrated data platform to answer a variety of
research questions, as well as separate questionnaires for
self-identiﬁed primary male and female decisionmakers in
sampled households. Our study relied primarily on informa-
tion concerning household demographics, educational attain-
ment, occupation and employment, food and nonfood
consumption and expenditures, household-level agricultural
production and livestock holding, household assets, housing
and amenities, community infrastructure and facilities, indi-
vidual anthropometric measurements, and a detailed module
on the WEAI.
The BIHS sample consists of 1,608 nonfarm and 3,895 farm
households; since the WEAI aims to measure agency in the
agricultural sector, we restrict our analysis to farm house-
holds, including households relying on agricultural wage
labor. The WEAI relies on information collected from both
primary male and female adults in the household, and thus,
our estimation samples depend on valid responses from these
household members. For the household-level analysis using
women’s 5DE alone, we use data from the self-identiﬁed pri-
mary female adult. Of these data, 424 observations were
dropped, because the primary female respondent was either
unavailable on the day of the interview or did not respond
to all of the WEAI survey questions. In addition, 192 observa-
tions were dropped because a female other than the primary
female was interviewed, and six additional cases were dropped
because of possible data entry errors in the demographic data.
Our ﬁnal estimation sample consists of 3,273 households. For
the analysis that examines women’s relative empowerment
within the household, we restrict the analyses to households
where both the primary male and female decisionmakers havebeen interviewed, reducing our sample size to 3,213 house-
holds.
For the individual-level analysis using women’s 5DE, BMI
values were obtained for 3,150 primary adult males and
3,263 primary adult females from farm households. For the
analysis examining women’s relative empowerment using the
gender parity gap, the sample sizes for men and women are
reduced to 3,094 and 3,203, respectively.(b) Empirical speciﬁcation
To examine the relationship between women’s empower-
ment in agriculture and household food security, we estimate
the following equation:
f ¼ b0 þ b1 empowerment þ b2xþ b3hþ b4cþ e; ð1Þ
where f is a vector of food security outcomes, bi are coeﬃ-
cients to be estimated, x is a vector of individual-level charac-
teristics, h is a vector of household-level characteristics, c is a
vector of community or village characteristics, and e is an
error term.
In addition to the base regression described in Eqn. (1), we
also examine how the relationship between women’s empower-
ment in agriculture and household food security varies by the
size of cultivable land owned by the household. We therefore
estimate the augmented equation:
f ¼ b0 þ b1 empowerment þ b2lnðlandareaþ 1Þ
þ b3½empowerment  lnðlandareaþ 1Þ þ b4x
þ b5haug þ b6cþ v; ð2Þ
where b3 represents the interaction eﬀect of empowerment and
land area, haug is a vector of household-level characteristics
excluding land, and v is an error term. 3
We use two measures of women’s empowerment in alterna-
tive speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst main speciﬁcation, estimated for
the full estimation sample, our measure of empowerment is the
women’s 5DE score; in the second main speciﬁcation, esti-
mated for a subsample of households in which we have both
men’s and women’s empowerment scores, our measure of
empowerment consists of the gender parity gap, computed
by taking the diﬀerence between the men’s and women’s
5DE scores for households that do not have gender parity. 4
Because it is likely that women’s empowerment within the
household might be aﬀected by the same factors aﬀecting the
availability of food and dietary diversity, we apply standard
instrumental variables techniques to correct for potential end-
ogeneity bias, using the ivreg2 procedure in Stata12 (Baum,
Schaﬀer, & Stillman, 2010; StataCorp., 2011).(c) Outcome variables
(i) Per capita calorie availability
A commonly used indicator for food security at the house-
hold level is calorie availability, constructed by converting
quantities of food consumed into corresponding energy units.
Food consumption data, covering around 300 food items,
were collected at the household level. The data capture quan-
tities consumed from market purchases, home production, and
from other sources outside the house, e.g., relatives, govern-
ment/nongovernment aid, or food received in exchange for
labor. Agricultural seasonality is of concern when working
with food consumption data, since lack of labor market activ-
ities during the lean season might aﬀect household income,
food expenditure, and consequently food consumption. The
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lean seasons prevalent in Bangladesh, thus allaying concerns
about seasonality. The 7-day data were converted to daily
calorie equivalents and the resulting calorie values were
divided by the household size to obtain per capita calorie
availability values (Ahmed & Shams, 1994). 5(ii) Household dietary diversity
One of the criticisms of the use of calorie availability indica-
tors is that they do not reﬂect the quality of foods available to
households (Ruel, 2003). This is particularly relevant for
developing countries where diets are heavily dependent on
starchy staples, contain little animal products, and may be
high in fats and sugars (Carletto, Zezza, & Banerjee, 2013).
In recent years, household dietary diversity measures have
gained importance as measures of household food security,
especially as several studies have demonstrated a strong asso-
ciation between dietary diversity and household per capita
consumption and daily caloric availability (Hatloˆy et al.,
2000; Hoddinott & Yohannes, 2002). Household dietary diver-
sity is deﬁned as the count of food groups consumed using the
7-day recall household food consumption data. Food was
grouped into 12 categories: cereals, white tubers and roots,
vegetables, fruits, meat, eggs, ﬁsh and other seafood, legumes
and nuts, milk and milk products, oils and fats, sweets, and
spices, condiments, and beverages (FAO, 2011b); this measure
has been validated as a measure of household food security
and is being increasingly used.(iii) Adult BMI
Per capita calorie availability only measures what is avail-
able at the household level, given household size, but not its
intrahousehold distribution or utilization by individuals. It is
not a suﬃcient indicator of food energy deﬁciency, which
requires comparing calorie availability against the energy
requirement of households, which, in turn, depends on the
age and sex composition of households, and their individual
height, weight, and activity levels (Carletto et al., 2013). More-
over, measures of short-term nutritional status, such as BMI,
also reﬂect current energy expenditure, health status, and
access to health services and sanitation (UNICEF, 1990).
Gender disparities in BMI can be aﬀected by the intrahouse-
hold distribution of food, work eﬀort, and health inputs; for
women, BMI is also aﬀected by pregnancy and lactation
status. In the absence of data on activity levels, we use BMI
values to indicate food energy deﬁciency. BMI values were cal-
culated for the primary adult male and female decisionmakers
and analyzed separately for men and women.Figure 1. Contribution of each of the ﬁve domains to the disempowerment of
women. Source: Sraboni, Quisumbing, and Ahmed (2013).(d) Key independent variables
(i) Women’s empowerment in agriculture index
To measure women’s empowerment in agriculture, we use
the WEAI, computed using individual-level data collected
from primary male and female respondents within the same
households.
Table 1 presents the ﬁve domains, which comprise ten indi-
cators. Each domain is weighted equally, as are each of the
indicators within a domain. The 5DE sub-index is a measure
of empowerment that shows the number of domains in which
women are empowered. A woman is deﬁned as empowered in
5DE if she has adequate achievements in four of the ﬁve
domains or is empowered in some combination of the
weighted indicators that reﬂect 80% total adequacy. The ﬁve
domains of empowerment are deﬁned as follows:(ii) Production
This domain concerns decisions over agricultural produc-
tion, and refers to sole or joint decisionmaking over food
and cash-crop farming, livestock, and ﬁsheries, as well as
autonomy in agricultural production.
(iii) Resources
This domain concerns ownership, access to, and decision-
making power over productive resources such as land, live-
stock, agricultural equipment, consumer durables, and credit.
(iv) Income
This domain concerns sole or joint control over the use of
income and expenditures.
(v) Leadership
This domain concerns leadership in the community, here
measured by membership in economic or social groups and
comfort in speaking in public.
(vi) Time
This domain concerns the allocation of time to productive
and domestic tasks and satisfaction with the available time
for leisure activities.
A key innovation of the Index is that it identiﬁes the
domains in which women are disempowered as well as the rel-
ative degree of disempowerment. We use the diagnostic results
on the WEAI, which describes the overall pattern of women’s
disempowerment across the ﬁve domains in rural Bangladesh,
to guide our choice of empowerment indicators. We ﬁrst iden-
tify the key domains that contribute the most to disempower-
ment, and then within each key domain, identify the indicators
that contribute the most to disempowerment. We then con-
struct a continuous measure of empowerment that draws on
the individual-level data for the identiﬁed indicators.
Figure 1 shows that the leadership and resources domains
contribute the most to women’s disempowerment in rural
Bangladesh, while Figure 2 shows the contribution of each
domain indicator. Group membership emerges as the indicator
that contributes most to disempowerment in the leadership
Figure 2. Contribution of each of the 10 domain indicators to
disempowerment of women. Source: Sraboni et al. (2013).
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critical indicator for the resources domain. The credit
indicator, however, may be problematic, since it is not clear
whether nonborrowers are truly credit constrained (they may
not avail of credit because they have suﬃcient liquidity). In
light of this issue, we also analyze the two other indicators
for the resources domain, namely, asset ownership and rights
over assets. Based on this information, we use the following
alternative measures of empowerment.
Model 1: Aggregate empowerment score of primary female
respondent is the 5DE empowerment score of the female
respondent in the household, which is the weighted average
of her achievements in the ten indicators that comprise the ﬁve
domains of empowerment in agriculture. This measure is
increasing in empowerment, and ranges from zero to one.
Model 2: (Leadership domain, Group membership indicator)
Number of groups in which woman is an active member is the
total number of groups in which the female respondent reports
being an active member.
Model 3: (Resources domain, Access to and decisions on
credit indicator) Average number of decisions, concerning
credit, taken by female is the number of credit decisions that
the female respondent has made solely or jointly, averaged
over the lending sources used. For each of the ﬁve possible
lending sources non-government organization (NGO), infor-
mal, formal, friends/family, and rotating savings and credit
associations (ROSCAs), the survey asks who made the deci-
sion to borrow and who made the decision on how to use
the money/item borrowed.
Model 4: (Resources domain, Asset ownership indicator)
Number of assets woman has sole/joint ownership of is the total
number of asset types for which the female respondent reports
sole or joint ownership.
Model 5: (Resources domain, Rights over assets indicator)
Number of sole/joint decisions, concerning purchase/sale/transfer
of assets, taken by woman is the total number of decisions made
solely or jointly by the female respondent, summed over all asset
types. For each asset type, the survey asks who can decide
whether to sell, give away, mortgage/rent, and purchase the
asset.
Considerable evidence exists in support of the need to pay
attention to intrahousehold gender inequality for attaining
development objectives (Alderman et al., 1995; Haddad
et al., 1997; Quisumbing, 2003). Therefore, it is interesting to
examine whether women’s relative empowerment within thehousehold is associated with household food security. The
Gender Parity Index (GPI) is a composite index that reﬂects
the percentage of women who have gender parity as well as
the empowerment gap between men and women in households
not having gender parity. Because we are interested in examin-
ing how diﬀerences between empowerment levels of men and
women aﬀect household food security outcomes, we use the
gender parity gap component of the GPI as our measure of
empowerment. Since we need both male and female scores
to compute the gender parity gap, we use the smaller estima-
tion sample of 3,213 households where both the primary male
and female decisionmakers have been interviewed.
Model 6: Gender parity gap: According to Alkire et al.
(2013), a household enjoys parity if the woman is empowered
or her empowerment score is greater than or equal to that of
the male in her household. Thus, the gender parity gap is zero
if the household enjoys gender parity. Otherwise, the gap
equals the diﬀerence in the male and female aggregate empow-
erment scores.(e) Instruments
We use the diﬀerence in ages between the primary male and
female decisionmakers, and number of types of informal credit
sources in the village as instruments for all of the empower-
ment indicators. The survey collected information on whether
the following types of informal credit sources are present in
the community—moneylender within/outside village, shop-
keepers who oﬀer credit, agricultural input dealers who sell
on credit, and large farmers/traders who buy crops at a ﬁxed
forward price. We do not include formal credit sources,
because obtaining credit from these sources typically require
collateral (which could be correlated with household wealth
and could directly aﬀect the outcomes being considered), nor
NGOs, because obtaining credit from NGOs is membership-
based. The existence of a large number of informal credit
sources could be indicative of both greater social capital
within the community, which could inﬂuence a woman’s deci-
sion to actively participate in a group, as well as the size of the
informal credit market. The availability of a large pool of
funds could thus facilitate decisionmaking concerning credit,
and accumulation of assets by the borrowers. The diﬀerences
in ages can reﬂect diﬀerences in human capital between the pri-
mary female and her spouse, and therefore reﬂect relative bar-
gaining strengths (Quisumbing & Hallman, 2005). 6
We also instrument empowerment scores, the gender parity
gap as well as group membership using information on the
number of community activities the woman participated in
during the previous year; a woman who is more active in the
community is more likely to be an active participant in groups.
The survey collected information on whether the woman has
contributed money or time to the following community activ-
ities—building/maintenance of small wells or irrigation facili-
ties, roads, development projects, local mosque or other
religious structure, helping out other families with childcare,
agricultural labor, or care of a patient—during the previous
year. The diﬀerence in recall period implies that the decision
to participate in the mentioned activities was already given
(exogenous) prior to the current decision to join (or maintain
membership in) a group.
An additional variable—whether the homestead land has
been inherited by the woman, is used to instrument for both
ownership of and rights over assets. Inherited assets have
been previously used as a bargaining measure in the litera-
ture (Quisumbing 1994; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2003).
While inherited land is arguably endogenous, inherited
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error term.
(f) Other independent variables
Our analysis controls for a number of household and com-
munity characteristics, as well as individual characteristics for
the BMI regressions. Household characteristics include age,
age-squared, and years of schooling of the household head, 7
household size, and proportion of males and females in vari-
ous age groups (with males aged 60 and above as the excluded
category). The occupation of the household head is accounted
for using dummy variables for two types of primary occupa-
tion: farming and trading. We also include the price of rice
as a control variable, since rice is the staple food in Bangla-
desh, accounting for a ﬁfth of all spending of an average rural
household, 35% of food expenditure, and 71% of total calorie
intake (Ahmed et al., 2013). The number of dairy cows owned
by a household is expected to aﬀect the food security outcomes
through the pathway of production and consumption of milk
and milk products, as well as household wealth. Three other
variables are used as indicators of the socioeconomic status
of the household: the amount, in decimals, of cultivable land
owned by the household, a dummy for whether the household
has access to electricity, and a dummy for whether it owns at
least one tube well. 8 Taken together these socioeconomic
characteristics represent the most important assets owned by
rural households in Bangladesh. We also include diversity in
food crop production (that is, the total number of food crops
produced by the household) as a regressor; if households con-
sume some of the food that they produce, then more diverse
agricultural production is expected to increase dietary diver-
sity at the household level. A change in total number of food
crops produced may also alter calorie availability of producer
households through explicit or implicit changes in household
income. A household’s crop production decisions may be
aﬀected by the same factors that inﬂuence its calorie availabil-
ity and dietary diversity, which could lead to endogeneity bias
in our analysis. We use the following instruments at the farm
level to identify food crop production diversity: (1) whether or
not the soil type is clay-loam, (2) whether or not the soil type is
sandy-loam, and (3) the percentage of cropped land that is irri-
gated. Division dummies are included to control for location-
speciﬁc eﬀects. For the regressions with adult male and female
BMI as dependent variables, we include the age and years of
education of the primary male and female. For the primary
female, we add two dummy variables indicating whether she
is pregnant or lactating. Summary statistics of all the variables
used are presented in Table 2.4. RESULTS
(a) Women’s empowerment and food security
Tables 3–8 present the ordinary least squares (OLS) and
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results for the deter-
minants of household food security and individual nutritional
status. IV diagnostics are presented at the end of each table.
First-stage results are available upon request. We ﬁrst discuss
results on calorie availability and dietary diversity, and then
discuss results on adult BMI.
For the regressions involving per capita calorie availability
and household dietary diversity (columns 1–4), the Ander-
son-Rubin and endogeneity test results imply that the endog-
enous variables are relevant and in fact, endogenous. The
overidentiﬁcation and under-identiﬁcation test results conﬁrmthat the instruments are valid and the models identiﬁed. The
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics show that the null hypothesis
for weak instruments is rejected at the 5% (Tables 3 and
6–8) and 10%-level thresholds (Table 4). However, the
F-statistic in Table 5 fails to exceed the critical value of 4.79,
which is associated with a bias relative to OLS of less than
30% (Stock & Yogo, 2005). This suggests that the instruments
used for women’s decisions on credit may be weak.
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 present the OLS coeﬃcient esti-
mates of the determinants of per capita calorie availability and
household dietary diversity, respectively. These estimates show
that the female empowerment score is highly signiﬁcant and
positively correlated with both these food security indicators
at the household level. In columns 2 and 4, after instrumenting
for both potentially endogenous variables (empowerment and
food crop production), the estimates show a similar pattern,
with the IV estimates being larger than the OLS estimates.
These results, together with the good performance of the
instruments in general, suggest that household diet diversity
and per capita calorie availability increase if the primary
female decisionmaker is more empowered; the larger IV coef-
ﬁcients suggest that neglecting endogeneity of empowerment
may underestimate the impact of increasing women’s empow-
erment on these food security outcomes.
Moving on to the individual indicators, in Table 4 we ﬁnd
that women’s group membership is positively and signiﬁcantly
correlated with the calorie availability measures and dietary
diversity. This implies that increasing the number of groups
in which women actively participate has a positive impact on
household food security outcomes. In Table 5, the OLS coef-
ﬁcient estimates (columns 1 and 3) for women’s decisionmak-
ing concerning credit are insigniﬁcant, but IV estimates emerge
as positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that women’s decision-
making concerning credit is signiﬁcant and positively corre-
lated with the food security outcomes (columns 2 and 4).
Since the weak-identiﬁcation test results suggest that the
instruments used for this particular model are weak, we take
these results with caution. An underlying problem with using
decisions on credit as an indicator of empowerment in this
context is that wealthier people may not need to avail of credit
(because they can self-ﬁnance) and that many microﬁnance
activities are targeted to poorer women in Bangladesh.
The OLS and IV coeﬃcient estimates of women’s ownership
of assets (presented in Table 6) and rights over assets (Table 7)
are signiﬁcantly positive, implying that female ownership of
and control over major household assets has a role to play
in improving household food security. Previous work in Ban-
gladesh has demonstrated that greater resource control by
women is associated with improved child health (Hallman,
2003); evaluations of the long-term impact of agricultural
interventions have similarly showed that interventions tar-
geted to women’s groups have increased women’s assets and
improved nutritional status of women and girls (Kumar &
Quisumbing, 2010).
Table 8 presents the regression results for the gender parity
gap and food security outcomes. The OLS and IV coeﬃcient
estimates of the gender parity gap are signiﬁcant and negative,
implying that a reduction in the gap is associated with an
increase in calorie availability and household dietary diversity.
Reducing the gender gap in empowerment or improving
women’s relative empowerment is associated with greater food
security at the household level, consistent with the existing lit-
erature on female bargaining power within the household and
household welfare outcomes.
In most of the IV models, the eﬀect of number of food
crops produced by household on calorie availability at the
Table 2. Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
Per capita calorie availability 3,273 2,487 688 979 7,115
Per adult equivalent calorie availability 3,273 3,185 813 1,186 9,530
Household dietary diversity 3,273 9.54 1.58 4 12
Body mass index (BMI) of primary male respondent 3,150 20.13 2.74 12.65 32.79
Body mass index (BMI) of primary female respondent 3,263 20.75 3.36 12.94 34.69
Empowerment variables
Empowerment score of woman 3,273 0.67 0.23 0.07 1
Number of groups woman is an active member of 3,273 0.33 0.49 0 3
Average number of decisions over credit 3,273 0.96 0.98 0 2
Number of assets woman has self/joint ownership of 3,273 1.96 1.50 0 10
Number of self/joint decisions over purchase, sale, or transfer of assets
made by woman
3,273 11.90 9.76 0 48
Gender parity gap 3,213 0.17 0.20 0 0.89
Other controls
Age (in years) of household head 3,273 45.26 13.39 20 95
Age-squared of household head 3,273 2,228 1,303 400 9,025
Years of education of household head 3,273 2.97 3.82 0 16
Age (in years) of primary male respondent 3,150 45.27 13.42 20 95
Age-squared of primary male respondent 3,150 2,230 1,307 400 9,025
Years of education of primary male respondent 3,150 2.99 3.84 0 16
Age (in years) of primary female respondent 3,263 37.21 11.70 18 80
Age-squared of primary female respondent 3,263 1,522 949 324 6,400
Years of education of primary female respondent 3,263 2.93 3.42 0 16
Female respondent is pregnant (= 1, 0 otherwise) 3,263 0.04 0.18 0 1
Female respondent is lactating (= 1, 0 otherwise) 3,263 0.18 0.39 0 1
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 3,273 0.31 0.46 0 1
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 3,273 0.08 0.27 0 1
Household size 3,273 4.36 1.57 2 17
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 3,273 0.05 0.10 0 0.6
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 3,273 0.07 0.12 0 0.6
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 3,273 0.07 0.12 0 0.67
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 3,273 0.25 0.14 0 0.75
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 3,273 0.05 0.10 0 0.6
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 3,273 0.07 0.12 0 0.5
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 3,273 0.07 0.12 0 0.6
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 3,273 0.28 0.12 0 0.75
Proportion of females 60 years and older 3,273 0.04 0.10 0 0.67
Number of food crops produced by household 3,273 1.27 1.42 0 11
Number of dairy cows owned 3,273 0.74 1.20 0 9
Price of rice (in taka) 3,273 29.90 3.38 20 50
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 3,273 0.70 1.55 0 6.98
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 3,273 0.44 0.50 0 1
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 3,273 0.25 0.43 0 1
Division dummy 1 3,273 0.06 0.23 0 1
Division dummy 2 3,273 0.10 0.29 0 1
Division dummy 3 3,273 0.29 0.45 0 1
Division dummy 4 3,273 0.14 0.35 0 1
Division dummy 5 3,273 0.20 0.40 0 1
Division dummy 6 3,273 0.16 0.37 0 1
Instruments
Age diﬀerence (male–female) 3,273 8.08 4.60 15 40
Types of informal credit sources in village 3,273 2.36 1.50 0 5
Whether female has participated in any community activity during the
previous year (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
3,273 0.46 0.50 0 1
Number of community activities woman has participated in during the
previous year
3,273 0.86 1.18 0 7
Whether homestead land has been inherited by woman (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 3,273 0.03 0.18 0 1
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 3,273 0.28 0.45 0 1
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 3,273 0.18 0.38 0 1
% of land irrigated by household 3,273 46.26 42.29 0 100
Source: IFPRI Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey, 2011–12.
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Table 3. Model 1: Women’s empowerment score, household food security, and individual nutritional status outcomes
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Empowerment score of woman 235.364*** 891.858*** 0.493*** 1.938*** 0.119 0.447 0.256 0.021
(47.705) (172.793) (0.120) (0.411) (0.212) (0.775) (0.264) (0.885)
Age (in years) of household head 14.282** 9.929 0.010 0.023
(6.178) (6.644) (0.015) (0.016)
Age-squared of household head 0.110 0.067 0.000 0.000
(0.067) (0.072) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 8.639*** 8.514** 0.074*** 0.072***
(3.284) (3.347) (0.007) (0.008)
Age (in years) of member 0.059** 0.061** 0.238*** 0.239***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036)
Age-squared of member 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of member 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.119***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021)
Pregnant (= 1, 0 otherwise) 1.105*** 1.123***
(0.286) (0.286)
Lactating (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.861*** 0.850***
(0.184) (0.185)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 79.132*** 95.092*** 0.220*** 0.174** 0.137 0.123 0.040 0.077
(26.165) (34.737) (0.064) (0.081) (0.122) (0.148) (0.143) (0.180)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 39.311 15.330 0.547*** 0.514*** 0.977*** 0.992*** 0.452* 0.419*
(38.856) (40.629) (0.097) (0.100) (0.213) (0.214) (0.246) (0.247)
Household size 75.922*** 71.063*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.073* 0.069* 0.035 0.046
(8.606) (9.149) (0.020) (0.022) (0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.048)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 1,533.389*** 1,564.817*** 0.396 0.400 0.020 0.045 0.181 0.056
(199.816) (208.895) (0.473) (0.489) (0.868) (0.871) (1.002) (1.016)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 960.172*** 1,021.892*** 0.379 0.284 0.605 0.636 1.050 0.971
(187.744) (195.191) (0.421) (0.436) (0.806) (0.808) (0.921) (0.929)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 301.962 363.127* 0.151 0.275 0.215 0.244 1.518* 1.486*
(185.377) (192.144) (0.414) (0.428) (0.792) (0.791) (0.895) (0.898)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 165.236 163.044 0.542* 0.534 1.220* 1.216* 1.854*** 1.860***
(153.994) (158.439) (0.314) (0.326) (0.659) (0.656) (0.676) (0.674)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 1,604.705*** 1,596.603*** 0.495 0.599 0.137 0.141 0.705 0.579
(198.528) (206.674) (0.474) (0.490) (0.864) (0.868) (1.015) (1.018)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 813.647*** 892.625*** 0.573 0.425 0.964 1.005 0.610 0.546
(192.091) (198.954) (0.424) (0.438) (0.833) (0.837) (0.925) (0.936)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 153.315 260.023 0.498 0.267 0.273 0.328 1.637* 1.590*
(199.495) (205.349) (0.432) (0.450) (0.822) (0.823) (0.948) (0.961)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 30.101 22.283 0.944* 0.855* 1.121 1.140 1.787 1.747
(226.492) (232.903) (0.501) (0.519) (1.012) (1.011) (1.098) (1.095)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 319.497 357.407 0.300 0.254 1.040 1.055 2.269* 2.210*
(250.737) (257.477) (0.519) (0.539) (1.095) (1.096) (1.228) (1.228)
Number of food crops produced by household 36.259*** 24.510 0.075*** 0.142** 0.086** 0.071 0.040 0.087
(9.009) (23.556) (0.020) (0.057) (0.038) (0.102) (0.047) (0.126)
Number of dairy cows owned 49.536*** 44.001*** 0.126*** 0.095*** 0.078* 0.080* 0.035 0.058
(10.399) (11.409) (0.024) (0.026) (0.044) (0.048) (0.057) (0.060)
Price of rice (in taka) 4.194 1.502 0.021** 0.027*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.043** 0.044**
(3.952) (4.083) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 28.398*** 29.720*** 0.038** 0.042** 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.132*** 0.132***
(8.488) (8.678) (0.017) (0.018) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 100.024*** 45.094 0.286*** 0.143** 0.044 0.068 0.089 0.095
(26.863) (29.281) (0.063) (0.070) (0.122) (0.135) (0.146) (0.160)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 10.708 14.117 0.411*** 0.355*** 0.512*** 0.525*** 0.626*** 0.620***
(22.838) (24.523) (0.056) (0.060) (0.105) (0.108) (0.127) (0.129)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2,691.208*** 2,339.944*** 7.291*** 6.537*** 15.248*** 15.434*** 11.971*** 11.822***
(219.368) (243.215) (0.530) (0.587) (1.015) (1.097) (1.179) (1.213)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
F 41.928 38.481 26.628 25.084 12.722 12.404 15.078 15.007
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.230 0.175 0.130 0.113 0.112 0.106 0.103
(continued on next page)
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Table 3—Continued
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.470 0.640 0.311 0.192
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 41.798 41.798 39.627 40.325
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.456 0.352
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.449 0.345
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000 0.000 0.925 0.582
First stage Adjusted R2 (Empowerment score of
woman)
0.180 0.180 0.181 0.183
First stage Adjusted R2 (Number of food crops
produced by household)
0.314 0.314 0.310 0.313
Source: Estimated by authors using data from the IFPRI Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey, 2011–12.
Note: Estimates from base regression without interaction with land. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
20 WORLD DEVELOPMENThousehold level is insigniﬁcant, but a strong and signiﬁcant
positive association between crop diversity and dietary diver-
sity is evident; the more food crops the households produce,
the higher their dietary diversity. The number of dairy cows
owned has a signiﬁcant positive impact on both household
food energy availability and household dietary diversity in
all models. Rice price is not signiﬁcantly associated with
household level food energy availability, but is strongly and
positively associated with the household-level dietary diver-
sity. The latter ﬁnding is similar to that of Rashid, Smith,
and Rahman (2011), who argue that households may respond
to an increase in rice price by partially shifting consumption
away from rice to other food items, which results in an
increase in dietary diversity. Owned cultivable land is strongly
associated with both household food energy availability and
household dietary diversity in all models; larger areas of culti-
vable land may increase household-level calorie availability
and dietary diversity both through an income or wealth eﬀect,
as well as by making available a larger stock of productive
assets. However, the other two income-related variables—
ownership of hand tube well and access to electricity—appear
to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence household-level food energy avail-
ability and dietary diversity only in certain models.
Consistent with the existing literature on human capital and
household food security, the education of the household head
has a positive and signiﬁcant relationship with both calorie
availability and dietary diversity. Having a household head
whose primary occupation is farming signiﬁcantly increases
both calorie availability and dietary diversity in most of the
regression models. The positive relationship between farming
as the main occupation with both calorie availability and die-
tary diversity is consistent with our other result that diversity
in agricultural production increases dietary diversity at the
household level. Having a household head who is primarily
involved in trade improves only dietary diversity, not calorie
availability.
Household size has a signiﬁcant negative impact on per
capita calorie availability in all the regressions, but has a
positive and signiﬁcant correlation with diet diversity. Since
a household member may have access to food from a
variety of sources (home production, purchased outsidethe house, received in exchange for labor, etc.), a larger
household size may simply be a reﬂection of the greater
variety in food consumption patterns as a result of having
more people living in the household. Coeﬃcients on demo-
graphic categories indicate that household demographic
composition signiﬁcantly aﬀects calorie availability across
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the empowerment variable, but
only a few demographic categories signiﬁcantly aﬀect die-
tary diversity. In the (preferred) IV speciﬁcation, house-
holds with a larger proportion of females between 19 and
59 years of age have more diverse diets; these coeﬃcients
are weakly signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcations using the overall
empowerment score and asset-based empowerment indica-
tors.
For regressions involving male and female BMI, we fail to
reject the exogeneity of women’s empowerment and household
crop production in the adult male and female BMI equations
(columns 6 and 8); hence the OLS results (columns 5 and 7)
are our preferred estimates for this sample.
Most of the indicators for women’s empowerment do not
have any signiﬁcant impact on adult male (column 5 of Tables
3 and 6–8) and adult female BMI (column 7 of Tables 3–8),
suggesting that other factors, such as household wealth, edu-
cation, and occupation (discussed below), are more important
determinants of adult male and female nutritional status.
However, women’s group membership and decisionmaking
concerning credit are negatively and signiﬁcantly associated
with adult male BMI (column 5 of Tables 4 and 5). Taken
together with our ﬁndings on calorie availability and dietary
diversity, these results suggest that adults in households where
the primary female has larger social networks and greater
access to credit may have increased energy requirements
beyond that which is provided by the increased access to food.
The insigniﬁcant impacts on females and signiﬁcant and nega-
tive impact on males may result from higher demands on male
labor, resulting in higher activity levels and therefore greater
energy deﬁciencies for men. Our ﬁndings on credit may also
be reﬂecting poverty, given that credit is typically targeted to
women in poor households. These hypotheses deserve further
investigation in future work. We ﬁnd that the number of food
crops produced by the household has a strongly signiﬁcant
Table 4. Model 2: Women’s group membership, household food security, and individual nutritional status outcomes
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of groups woman is an active member of 39.109* 813.559*** 0.109* 1.673*** 0.264** 0.134 0.032 0.501
(22.939) (186.928) (0.057) (0.424) (0.103) (0.664) (0.125) (0.753)
Age (in years) of household head 15.426** 6.450 0.008 0.029*
(6.125) (7.423) (0.015) (0.017)
Age-squared of household head 0.120* 0.016 0.000 0.000*
(0.066) (0.081) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 8.837*** 11.529*** 0.074*** 0.078***
(3.304) (3.922) (0.007) (0.009)
Age (in years) of member 0.062** 0.060* 0.235*** 0.231***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.037)
Age-squared of member 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of member 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.119***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021)
Pregnant (= 1, 0 otherwise) 1.105*** 1.123***
(0.285) (0.284)
Lactating (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.856*** 0.853***
(0.184) (0.184)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 80.475*** 201.120*** 0.226*** 0.387*** 0.102 0.113 0.030 0.166
(26.353) (51.229) (0.064) (0.114) (0.122) (0.193) (0.144) (0.234)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 45.881 10.528 0.559*** 0.509*** 0.983*** 0.980*** 0.442* 0.395
(39.175) (50.801) (0.097) (0.115) (0.212) (0.214) (0.246) (0.249)
Household size 77.840*** 82.949*** 0.073*** 0.056** 0.075* 0.074* 0.037 0.046
(8.671) (10.772) (0.020) (0.023) (0.040) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 1,528.809*** 1,643.825*** 0.402 0.245 0.053 0.042 0.137 0.098
(199.730) (234.459) (0.473) (0.531) (0.865) (0.874) (1.002) (1.043)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 943.952*** 1,051.360*** 0.410 0.234 0.633 0.619 1.007 0.839
(187.720) (220.073) (0.421) (0.477) (0.802) (0.809) (0.921) (0.950)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 289.250 469.103** 0.131 0.483 0.274 0.243 1.479* 1.332
(185.171) (215.354) (0.414) (0.468) (0.789) (0.806) (0.895) (0.932)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 164.890 141.817 0.540* 0.491 1.227* 1.226* 1.839*** 1.792***
(153.762) (171.874) (0.314) (0.354) (0.655) (0.655) (0.676) (0.685)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 1,606.313*** 1,560.295*** 0.494 0.674 0.124 0.141 0.685 0.521
(198.999) (234.269) (0.474) (0.525) (0.860) (0.864) (1.015) (1.024)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 791.767*** 913.201*** 0.615 0.396 0.992 0.976 0.563 0.415
(191.789) (220.747) (0.424) (0.475) (0.830) (0.836) (0.924) (0.953)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 129.198 408.405* 0.539 0.021 0.355 0.307 1.572* 1.364
(199.970) (232.738) (0.432) (0.505) (0.820) (0.846) (0.948) (1.018)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 45.373 17.950 0.974* 0.873 1.134 1.129 1.760 1.666
(226.539) (255.454) (0.500) (0.549) (1.009) (1.008) (1.097) (1.104)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 310.409 390.661 0.316 0.193 1.074 1.061 2.240* 2.095*
(250.924) (283.066) (0.518) (0.575) (1.092) (1.099) (1.228) (1.251)
Number of food crops produced by household 38.339*** 18.129 0.079*** 0.133** 0.086** 0.078 0.037 0.109
(9.092) (27.980) (0.020) (0.064) (0.038) (0.104) (0.047) (0.128)
Number of dairy cows owned 52.596*** 69.454*** 0.132*** 0.147*** 0.072* 0.073 0.034 0.071
(10.426) (14.079) (0.024) (0.031) (0.044) (0.050) (0.057) (0.064)
Price of rice (in taka) 4.851 1.351 0.020** 0.033*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.045** 0.048**
(3.975) (4.827) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 28.612*** 42.641*** 0.038** 0.069*** 0.149*** 0.152*** 0.134*** 0.142***
(8.513) (10.334) (0.017) (0.021) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044) (0.047)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 115.792*** 32.833 0.316*** 0.126 0.064 0.047 0.064 0.046
(26.784) (35.942) (0.063) (0.080) (0.120) (0.137) (0.147) (0.160)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 18.498 3.726 0.427*** 0.381*** 0.517*** 0.512*** 0.617*** 0.607***
(22.946) (27.953) (0.056) (0.065) (0.104) (0.107) (0.127) (0.128)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2,818.102*** 2,841.667*** 7.558*** 7.625*** 15.178*** 15.180*** 11.868*** 11.926***
(220.021) (256.485) (0.529) (0.592) (1.004) (1.000) (1.180) (1.188)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
F 40.377 29.168 25.837 21.037 13.151 12.488 15.092 14.952
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.017 0.171 0.052 0.115 0.114 0.105 0.098
(continued on next page)
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Table 4—Continued
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.247 0.914 0.151 0.137
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 9.545 9.545 9.059 9.782
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.296 0.255
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.289 0.249
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.524
First stage Adjusted R2 (Number of groups woman is
an active member of)
0.106 0.106 0.108 0.106
First stage Adjusted R2 (Number of food crops
produced by household)
0.321 0.321 0.317 0.320
Source: Estimated by authors using data from the IFPRI Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey, 2011–12.
Note: Estimates from base regression without interaction with land. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
22 WORLD DEVELOPMENTnegative association with adult male BMI in all of the models,
possibly because growing more crops increases the intensity of
labor inputs in the ﬁeld, which is primarily a male domain.
Rice price is strongly and positively associated with male
and female BMI in all models, possibly working through
two pathways. First, an increase in the rice price would
increase the income of net sellers of rice (who would typically
be farming households), hence BMI of household members is
expected to improve. Second, an increase in the rice price may
also induce a shift toward higher quality diets, possibly from
staple to protein-based diets.
Household wealth indicators such as owned cultivable land
and access to electricity are strongly and positively associated
with both male and female BMI in all models; however, the
number of dairy cows has a positive and signiﬁcant impact
on adult male BMI only. Dairying is very intensive in female
labor (Quisumbing et al., 2013), although we do not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant impact on female BMI of dairy cow ownership.
The education of the primary male and female also has sig-
niﬁcant and positive impact on their BMI. Primary males and
females also have higher BMIs in households where the pri-
mary male (household head) is engaged in trading, possibly
because trading is less physically strenuous than farming.
Household size is signiﬁcantly and positively associated with
male BMI in most of the models. Pregnancy and lactation sta-
tus signiﬁcantly aﬀect women’s BMI, with pregnant women
having signiﬁcantly higher BMI, but with lactating women
having signiﬁcantly lower BMIs. The latter ﬁnding highlights
the biological demands of lactation, and indicates that lactat-
ing women are a nutritionally vulnerable group in the Ban-
gladeshi context.
(b) Household wealth and the impact of women’s empowerment
on food security
There is suggestive evidence from India (Eswaran,
Ramaswami, & Wadhwa, 2013) that the relationship between
women’s empowerment and status (as determined by caste and
wealth) may not be positive. Using time allocation data, they
show that women’s market work relative to males is lower in
the higher castes, suggesting that greater family status may
result in lower autonomy for women. Because land is the most
important asset for rural Bangladeshi households, we examinehow the relationship between women’s empowerment in agri-
culture and household food security varies by the size of
owned cultivable land. As shown in Eqn. (2) (Section 3b),
we estimate the interaction eﬀect of empowerment and land
area, with selected regression results presented in Table 9.
The IV diagnostics for the regressions involving calorie avail-
ability and dietary diversity (Models 1, 2, 4, and 6) show that
while the results of the Anderson Rubin, overidentiﬁcation,
and underidentiﬁcation tests deteriorate to some extent, the
endogenous variables are still relevant, the null hypotheses
of exogeneity can be rejected, the instruments remain valid,
and the models are identiﬁed. However, for Models 3 and 5,
we fail to reject the null that the model is under-identiﬁed;
the weak-identiﬁcation test results for Models 3, 4, and 5 sug-
gest that our instruments are weak. For the regressions involv-
ing male and female BMI, we fail to reject the exogeneity of
women’s empowerment and household crop production in
the adult male and female BMI equations; hence the OLS
results (columns 5 and 7) are taken to be valid for this sample.
Given the weak performance of the 2SLS estimates in Models
3, 4, and 5 in the regressions with interactions (compared to
the base regression), we treat the results of the augmented
regressions with the appropriate caveats, and focus on the dis-
cussion of the interaction terms rather than the main eﬀects,
for which the impacts are qualitatively similar to the base
regressions.
The interactions of the women’s empowerment indicators
with the size of owned land are signiﬁcant only in some of
the models, and these results should also be taken with
caution, given the performance of the instruments. Calorie
availability tends to decrease in larger landowner households
where women own more assets (column 2 of Model 4,
Table 9) and diet diversity decreases in larger landowner
households where women take more decisions concerning
assets (column 4 of Model 5, Table 9). 9 For households own-
ing more land, women who are involved in a greater number
of groups and make more decisions on credit tend to have
lower BMI (column 7 of Models 2 and 3). With the appropri-
ate caveats, these results appear to indicate that the positive
eﬀect of the diﬀerent dimensions of female empowerment on
food security outcomes is greater for smaller landowners,
that is, for less well-oﬀ households. While these results are
broadly consistent with the ﬁndings of Eswaran et al.
Table 5. Model 3: Women’s decisions on credit, household food security, and individual nutritional status outcomes
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average number of decisions over credit 0.127 806.335** 0.020 0.940* 0.135*** 0.580 0.059 0.882
(11.102) (313.472) (0.028) (0.543) (0.051) (0.771) (0.061) (0.991)
Age (in years) of household head 15.914*** 17.073 0.006 0.049*
(6.135) (16.396) (0.015) (0.028)
Age-squared of household head 0.126* 0.224 0.000 0.001*
(0.066) (0.175) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 8.713*** 17.340*** 0.073*** 0.082***
(3.304) (6.538) (0.007) (0.011)
Age (in years) of member 0.064** 0.082* 0.238*** 0.280***
(0.030) (0.045) (0.035) (0.060)
Age-squared of member 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Years of education of member 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.117*** 0.115***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022)
Pregnant (= 1, 0 otherwise) 1.099*** 1.017***
(0.286) (0.328)
Lactating (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.853*** 0.814***
(0.184) (0.194)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 75.134*** 307.092*** 0.207*** 0.380* 0.108 0.042 0.048 0.209
(26.390) (112.967) (0.064) (0.195) (0.122) (0.287) (0.143) (0.371)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 47.475 15.810 0.564*** 0.552*** 0.974*** 0.994*** 0.445* 0.455*
(39.196) (68.466) (0.098) (0.116) (0.212) (0.214) (0.246) (0.257)
Household size 77.518*** 58.839*** 0.074*** 0.087*** 0.070* 0.055 0.036 0.020
(8.636) (16.989) (0.020) (0.028) (0.040) (0.049) (0.046) (0.057)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 1,523.630*** 2,048.095*** 0.428 0.103 0.095 0.415 0.186 0.729
(199.666) (390.761) (0.474) (0.666) (0.870) (1.029) (1.001) (1.297)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 938.865*** 1,282.772*** 0.432 0.074 0.646 0.846 1.048 1.494
(187.610) (329.839) (0.422) (0.553) (0.806) (0.882) (0.920) (1.127)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 280.204 735.363** 0.095 0.622 0.291 0.588 1.528* 2.076*
(185.283) (339.529) (0.415) (0.579) (0.793) (0.940) (0.894) (1.135)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 166.093 99.133 0.545* 0.462 1.228* 1.254* 1.859*** 2.085***
(153.762) (230.437) (0.314) (0.376) (0.658) (0.663) (0.676) (0.744)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 1,609.422*** 1,903.357*** 0.491 0.250 0.178 0.366 0.712 1.026
(198.590) (348.876) (0.474) (0.612) (0.864) (0.924) (1.013) (1.178)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 785.832*** 1,086.839*** 0.639 0.313 1.003 1.197 0.600 0.997
(191.973) (332.238) (0.426) (0.553) (0.834) (0.895) (0.924) (1.081)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 115.074 477.554 0.588 0.160 0.317 0.535 1.620* 2.092*
(199.732) (336.649) (0.432) (0.568) (0.825) (0.900) (0.945) (1.134)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 48.339 76.428 0.985** 0.870 1.134 1.217 1.781 1.997*
(226.709) (354.347) (0.501) (0.592) (1.011) (1.027) (1.098) (1.176)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 306.680 560.668 0.332 0.078 1.088 1.291 2.277* 2.694*
(251.198) (391.181) (0.519) (0.643) (1.095) (1.155) (1.227) (1.405)
Number of food crops produced by household 38.471*** 37.308 0.080*** 0.108 0.085** 0.021 0.038 0.022
(9.088) (54.556) (0.020) (0.094) (0.038) (0.133) (0.047) (0.173)
Number of dairy cows owned 51.920*** 91.177*** 0.130*** 0.153*** 0.072* 0.045 0.031 0.010
(10.443) (24.800) (0.024) (0.043) (0.044) (0.064) (0.057) (0.083)
Price of rice (in taka) 5.169 6.870 0.019** 0.033** 0.057*** 0.051** 0.043** 0.031
(3.988) (7.605) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.026)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 27.889*** 18.896 0.037** 0.028 0.156*** 0.161*** 0.134*** 0.138***
(8.524) (13.731) (0.017) (0.022) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 120.209*** 30.360 0.331*** 0.196** 0.054 0.105 0.075 0.185
(26.698) (53.824) (0.063) (0.090) (0.121) (0.158) (0.146) (0.183)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 19.639 37.329 0.431*** 0.362*** 0.520*** 0.561*** 0.622*** 0.679***
(22.978) (44.644) (0.056) (0.078) (0.104) (0.128) (0.127) (0.146)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2,816.747*** 2,679.870*** 7.557*** 7.419*** 15.210*** 15.309*** 11.863*** 11.880***
(220.321) (354.557) (0.529) (0.627) (1.006) (1.035) (1.181) (1.232)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
F 40.253 14.729 25.562 17.980 12.860 11.896 15.076 14.149
Adjusted R2 0.269 1.001 0.170 0.168 0.115 0.090 0.106 0.051
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Table 4—Continued
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.592 0.397 0.244 0.263
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.031 0.031 0.012 0.032
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 2.134 2.134 2.594 2.125
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.356 0.314
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.349 0.307
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000 0.001 0.848 0.320
First stage Adjusted R2 (Average number of decisions
over credit)
0.059 0.059 0.063 0.057
First stage Adjusted R2 (Number of food crops
produced by household)
0.320 0.320 0.317 0.319
Source: Estimated by authors using data from the IFPRI Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey, 2011–12.
Note: Estimates from base regression without interaction with land. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
Table 6. Model 4: Women’s ownership of assets, household food security, and individual nutritional status outcomes
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of assets woman has self/joint ownership of 33.263*** 146.085*** 0.104*** 0.178** 0.032 0.069 0.051 0.137
(8.323) (33.343) (0.019) (0.078) (0.036) (0.148) (0.043) (0.173)
Age (in years) of household head 14.621** 10.146 0.011 0.018
(6.161) (6.614) (0.014) (0.015)
Age-squared of household head 0.113* 0.068 0.000 0.000
(0.067) (0.072) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 7.654** 4.012 0.070*** 0.066***
(3.257) (3.452) (0.007) (0.008)
Age (in years) of member 0.057* 0.060** 0.232*** 0.248***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037)
Age-squared of member 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of member 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.114*** 0.128***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.024)
Pregnant (= 1, 0 otherwise) 1.103*** 1.126***
(0.286) (0.287)
Lactating (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.849*** 0.870***
(0.184) (0.186)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 76.609*** 78.643** 0.216*** 0.115 0.139 0.136 0.031 0.052
(26.218) (34.327) (0.064) (0.078) (0.122) (0.144) (0.143) (0.175)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 39.113 11.481 0.538*** 0.545*** 0.962*** 0.995*** 0.433* 0.451*
(38.802) (41.059) (0.097) (0.099) (0.213) (0.220) (0.246) (0.249)
Household size 75.261*** 67.855*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.076* 0.069 0.041 0.036
(8.512) (9.154) (0.020) (0.021) (0.040) (0.043) (0.046) (0.050)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 1,519.595*** 1,503.062*** 0.429 0.532 0.025 0.005 0.121 0.138
(199.323) (208.246) (0.473) (0.479) (0.868) (0.873) (1.003) (1.011)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 950.629*** 988.932*** 0.387 0.413 0.595 0.599 0.982 1.067
(187.730) (196.402) (0.422) (0.430) (0.804) (0.807) (0.921) (0.931)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 306.015* 392.922** 0.187 0.230 0.191 0.239 1.440 1.620*
(185.826) (195.517) (0.414) (0.425) (0.790) (0.794) (0.896) (0.910)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 162.392 149.777 0.532* 0.520 1.228* 1.211* 1.825*** 1.907***
(153.699) (158.473) (0.314) (0.320) (0.659) (0.658) (0.675) (0.679)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 1,621.661*** 1,660.018*** 0.447 0.530 0.137 0.152 0.641 0.719
(198.185) (207.263) (0.474) (0.482) (0.863) (0.869) (1.016) (1.039)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 802.075*** 856.122*** 0.581 0.577 0.945 0.966 0.536 0.648
(192.398) (200.614) (0.425) (0.433) (0.831) (0.836) (0.925) (0.935)
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Table 6—Continued
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 158.353 304.838 0.443 0.351 0.224 0.317 1.511 1.795*
(200.579) (210.733) (0.432) (0.451) (0.820) (0.827) (0.949) (0.981)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 18.455 81.933 0.889* 0.856* 1.108 1.135 1.712 1.892*
(227.380) (239.440) (0.502) (0.519) (1.010) (1.013) (1.100) (1.113)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 343.769 468.114* 0.211 0.176 1.025 1.066 2.182* 2.389*
(250.994) (261.353) (0.520) (0.539) (1.094) (1.098) (1.231) (1.256)
Number of food crops produced by household 35.492*** 28.672 0.070*** 0.183*** 0.090** 0.076 0.033 0.058
(9.097) (23.999) (0.020) (0.056) (0.038) (0.102) (0.047) (0.123)
Number of dairy cows owned 48.602*** 36.671*** 0.120*** 0.089*** 0.073* 0.084* 0.028 0.068
(10.464) (12.087) (0.024) (0.026) (0.044) (0.049) (0.057) (0.061)
Price of rice (in taka) 4.833 3.687 0.020** 0.021** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.045** 0.042**
(3.957) (4.061) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 27.584*** 26.615*** 0.035** 0.037** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.133*** 0.132***
(8.533) (8.890) (0.017) (0.017) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 110.866*** 78.456*** 0.299*** 0.250*** 0.025 0.052 0.053 0.131
(26.577) (28.379) (0.062) (0.064) (0.121) (0.127) (0.146) (0.155)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 12.291 12.634 0.407*** 0.389*** 0.502*** 0.520*** 0.609*** 0.644***
(22.890) (25.116) (0.056) (0.059) (0.105) (0.108) (0.127) (0.130)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2,799.797*** 2,743.056*** 7.501*** 7.488*** 15.147*** 15.254*** 11.872*** 11.805***
(218.773) (226.553) (0.528) (0.535) (1.006) (1.017) (1.180) (1.177)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
F 41.121 37.357 27.427 24.975 12.792 12.437 15.119 14.884
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.218 0.179 0.166 0.113 0.110 0.106 0.098
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.574 0.518 0.277 0.343
Under ID test p, Ho: under-identiﬁed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 32.199 32.199 32.288 30.094
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.415 0.425
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.407 0.418
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.001 0.013 0.755 0.206
First stage Adjusted R2 (Number of assets woman has
self/joint ownership of)
0.128 0.128 0.132 0.135
First stage Adjusted R2 (Number of food crops
produced by household)
0.320 0.320 0.316 0.319
Source: Estimated by authors using data from the IFPRI Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey, 2011–12.
Note: Estimates from base regression without interaction with land. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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eﬀect of focusing women’s empowerment eﬀorts on poorer
households.
(c) Magnitudes of women’s empowerment eﬀects
Table 10 presents the elasticities of per capita calorie
availability, household dietary diversity, and adult BMI with
respect to the empowerment indicators and three household
characteristics—number of food crops produced by house-
hold, years of education of household head, and area of cul-
tivable land owned by household. Although the endogeneity
tests lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the
empowerment variables are exogenous, the IV diagnostics
lead us to doubt the validity of our 2SLS estimates for some
of the measures of empowerment. 10 Moreover, although the
empowerment indicators emerged as signiﬁcant in the 2SLSbase regressions, because the elasticities computed from the
2SLS speciﬁcation use predicted values of both the depen-
dent and explanatory variables, the standard errors of the
IV elasticities are quite large. These large standard errors
lead to the inability to estimate elasticities precisely using
the IV speciﬁcation, and lead one to accept the null hypoth-
eses that these elasticity estimates are insigniﬁcant, even if
they are larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates. We
therefore base our discussion of the elasticity estimates
mostly on the OLS results, treating them as a lower bound,
given the imprecision of the IV elasticity estimates. We ﬁnd
that the magnitude of the impact on calorie availability (col-
umn 1) and dietary diversity (column 3) of the overall
empowerment score is the highest—a 10% increase in the
empowerment score leads to a 6.3% increase in calorie avail-
ability and a 3.5% increase in dietary diversity in the OLS
regressions. After controlling for the potential endogeneity
Table 7. Model 5: Women’s rights over assets, household food security, and individual nutritional status outcomes
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of self/joint decisions over purchase, sale, or
transfer of assets made by woman
5.737*** 19.637*** 0.018*** 0.016 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.002
(1.243) (5.135) (0.003) (0.013) (0.006) (0.023) (0.007) (0.028)
Age (in years) of household head 13.646** 8.675 0.014 0.017
(6.124) (6.473) (0.015) (0.015)
Age-squared of household head 0.104 0.056 0.000 0.000
(0.066) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 7.625** 5.217 0.070*** 0.069***
(3.255) (3.368) (0.007) (0.008)
Age (in years) of member 0.060** 0.058* 0.232*** 0.238***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.038)
Age-squared of member 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of member 0.119*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.118***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023)
Pregnant (= 1, 0 otherwise) 1.109*** 1.125***
(0.285) (0.286)
Lactating (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.850*** 0.848***
(0.184) (0.187)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 71.321*** 75.632** 0.200*** 0.102 0.144 0.146 0.038 0.082
(26.184) (34.346) (0.064) (0.078) (0.121) (0.145) (0.142) (0.175)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 34.877 0.964 0.525*** 0.554*** 0.985*** 0.966*** 0.431* 0.413
(39.204) (43.539) (0.096) (0.101) (0.214) (0.225) (0.247) (0.254)
Household size 74.161*** 64.884*** 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.070* 0.075* 0.041 0.048
(8.566) (9.564) (0.020) (0.022) (0.040) (0.045) (0.046) (0.051)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 1,546.846*** 1,615.209*** 0.346 0.441 0.031 0.001 0.102 0.037
(199.041) (206.383) (0.471) (0.479) (0.868) (0.878) (1.002) (1.036)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 971.520*** 1,057.285*** 0.324 0.382 0.618 0.583 0.974 0.955
(187.126) (194.103) (0.419) (0.430) (0.806) (0.818) (0.921) (0.942)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 325.653* 437.470** 0.245 0.219 0.239 0.194 1.437 1.469
(185.415) (194.681) (0.412) (0.428) (0.792) (0.806) (0.895) (0.922)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 166.953 169.525 0.546* 0.542* 1.214* 1.224* 1.839*** 1.860***
(153.243) (154.577) (0.313) (0.315) (0.660) (0.655) (0.675) (0.673)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 1,630.065*** 1,694.354*** 0.422 0.532 0.153 0.125 0.650 0.560
(197.888) (205.187) (0.473) (0.483) (0.864) (0.873) (1.014) (1.038)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 821.326*** 911.444*** 0.523 0.564 0.978 0.939 0.530 0.532
(191.731) (197.929) (0.422) (0.435) (0.833) (0.842) (0.922) (0.944)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 155.518 253.923 0.455 0.470 0.281 0.244 1.542 1.578
(199.050) (203.938) (0.429) (0.443) (0.821) (0.825) (0.946) (0.962)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 16.339 65.496 0.885* 0.925* 1.129 1.108 1.729 1.734
(226.667) (234.410) (0.498) (0.512) (1.013) (1.011) (1.097) (1.104)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 340.188 427.584* 0.224 0.279 1.052 1.026 2.203* 2.193*
(250.662) (257.228) (0.518) (0.530) (1.096) (1.098) (1.227) (1.245)
Number of food crops produced by household 34.134*** 8.077 0.066*** 0.181*** 0.083** 0.098 0.033 0.096
(9.093) (27.137) (0.020) (0.063) (0.038) (0.116) (0.048) (0.140)
Number of dairy cows owned 47.587*** 40.221*** 0.117*** 0.096*** 0.081* 0.078 0.028 0.058
(10.465) (11.727) (0.024) (0.026) (0.044) (0.048) (0.057) (0.061)
Price of rice (in taka) 4.737 3.757 0.020** 0.021** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.045** 0.044**
(3.969) (4.057) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 26.100*** 21.487** 0.031* 0.034* 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.132*** 0.131***
(8.498) (8.830) (0.017) (0.018) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044) (0.045)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 117.479*** 114.594*** 0.320*** 0.294*** 0.036 0.036 0.065 0.097
(26.503) (27.182) (0.062) (0.063) (0.121) (0.122) (0.146) (0.149)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 12.156 5.785 0.407*** 0.408*** 0.514*** 0.506*** 0.611*** 0.618***
(22.890) (24.534) (0.056) (0.059) (0.104) (0.108) (0.127) (0.129)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2,822.341*** 2,832.715*** 7.571*** 7.593*** 15.188*** 15.178*** 11.890*** 11.841***
(219.334) (222.547) (0.528) (0.530) (1.007) (0.999) (1.179) (1.178)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
F 41.058 37.590 28.025 25.513 12.761 12.490 15.086 15.011
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.240 0.181 0.172 0.113 0.112 0.106 0.103
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Table 7—Continued
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household
dietary diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.061 0.131 0.251 0.259
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 23.334 23.334 23.340 21.822
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.415 0.425
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.407 0.418
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.012 0.070 0.941 0.386
First stage Adjusted R2 (Number of self/joint
decisions over purchase, sale, or transfer of assets
made by woman)
0.181 0.181 0.190 0.188
First stage Adjusted R2 (Number of food crops
produced by household)
0.320 0.320 0.316 0.319
Source: Estimated by authors using data from the IFPRI Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey, 2011–12.
Note: Estimates from base regression without interaction with land. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
Table 8. Model 6: Gender parity gap, household food security, and individual nutritional status outcomes
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household dietary
diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Gender parity gap (= 0 if woman enjoys gender
parity, “gap” if not)
163.834*** 1,282.089*** 0.401*** 2.583*** 0.220 0.785 0.318 0.252
(52.646) (256.600) (0.133) (0.601) (0.241) (1.110) (0.301) (1.242)
Age (in years) of household head 15.976** 9.845 0.009 0.025
(6.217) (7.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Age-squared of household head 0.126* 0.066 0.000 0.000
(0.067) (0.076) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 9.238*** 10.081*** 0.074*** 0.074***
(3.330) (3.523) (0.007) (0.008)
Age (in years) of member 0.056* 0.059* 0.238*** 0.240***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.036) (0.037)
Age-squared of member 0.001** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of member 0.119*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.117***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021)
Pregnant (= 1, 0 otherwise) 1.159*** 1.178***
(0.294) (0.295)
Lactating (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.890*** 0.884***
(0.184) (0.184)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 74.163*** 84.660** 0.223*** 0.151* 0.130 0.110 0.038 0.056
(26.352) (35.405) (0.064) (0.082) (0.122) (0.146) (0.144) (0.177)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 43.092 4.451 0.556*** 0.505*** 0.940*** 0.967*** 0.488* 0.464*
(39.325) (42.673) (0.099) (0.103) (0.213) (0.216) (0.251) (0.253)
Household size 76.559*** 68.532*** 0.073*** 0.080*** 0.063 0.057 0.038 0.047
(8.692) (9.552) (0.020) (0.023) (0.041) (0.043) (0.047) (0.050)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 1,544.764*** 1,594.009*** 0.474 0.468 0.168 0.123 0.146 0.059
(204.887) (224.046) (0.477) (0.506) (0.877) (0.883) (1.017) (1.030)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 967.151*** 1,043.160*** 0.439 0.343 0.488 0.531 1.195 1.147
(191.741) (206.927) (0.422) (0.452) (0.812) (0.815) (0.935) (0.943)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 328.485* 425.453** 0.121 0.292 0.011 0.057 1.566* 1.553*
(190.186) (205.314) (0.418) (0.443) (0.802) (0.804) (0.909) (0.915)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 142.865 135.830 0.590* 0.579* 1.176* 1.171* 1.886*** 1.893***
(157.756) (168.143) (0.316) (0.336) (0.666) (0.665) (0.688) (0.686)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 1,613.382*** 1,597.564*** 0.525 0.662 0.013 0.026 0.617 0.517
(203.070) (220.178) (0.479) (0.506) (0.874) (0.880) (1.027) (1.029)
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Table 8—Continued
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household dietary
diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 839.164*** 969.284*** 0.582 0.363 0.869 0.935 0.697 0.663
(197.619) (213.360) (0.429) (0.459) (0.843) (0.851) (0.942) (0.959)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 149.120 289.433 0.553 0.291 0.237 0.304 1.522 1.511
(204.730) (217.506) (0.436) (0.467) (0.831) (0.833) (0.962) (0.977)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 8.155 80.391 0.983* 0.846 0.928 0.964 1.823 1.797
(231.876) (248.583) (0.506) (0.541) (1.017) (1.017) (1.112) (1.111)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 357.547 435.890 0.310 0.206 0.781 0.814 2.409* 2.367*
(256.315) (273.060) (0.523) (0.561) (1.099) (1.100) (1.244) (1.248)
Number of food crops produced by household 36.659*** 40.145* 0.080*** 0.195*** 0.080** 0.062 0.040 0.067
(9.105) (23.874) (0.020) (0.057) (0.038) (0.100) (0.048) (0.122)
Number of dairy cows owned 50.519*** 44.513*** 0.128*** 0.095*** 0.073* 0.073 0.039 0.060
(10.434) (11.663) (0.024) (0.026) (0.044) (0.048) (0.058) (0.060)
Price of rice (in taka) 3.700 0.469 0.021** 0.028*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.044** 0.044**
(3.868) (4.191) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 29.223*** 35.044*** 0.038** 0.051*** 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.134*** 0.133***
(8.609) (9.058) (0.017) (0.019) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.045)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 110.282*** 46.695 0.307*** 0.157** 0.046 0.073 0.062 0.083
(26.994) (30.367) (0.063) (0.071) (0.122) (0.134) (0.147) (0.159)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 12.421 13.203 0.408*** 0.357*** 0.519*** 0.532*** 0.632*** 0.632***
(23.142) (25.453) (0.057) (0.061) (0.105) (0.108) (0.127) (0.129)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2,821.997*** 3,085.689*** 7.585*** 8.115*** 15.336*** 15.220*** 11.699*** 11.699***
(222.972) (245.743) (0.535) (0.585) (1.016) (1.036) (1.212) (1.269)
Observations 3,213 3,213 3,213 3,213 3,094 3,094 3,203 3,203
F 40.077 34.102 26.200 23.094 12.467 12.048 15.215 15.136
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.170 0.173 0.091 0.111 0.110 0.107 0.106
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.553 0.423 0.425 0.255
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 27.216 27.216 25.550 25.764
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.566 0.446
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.559 0.439
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000 0.000 0.860 0.646
First stage Adjusted R2 (Gender parity gap) 0.121 0.121 0.118 0.121
First stage Adjusted R2 (Number of food crops
produced by household)
0.314 0.314 0.310 0.313
Source: Estimated by authors using data from the IFPRI Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey, 2011–12.
Note: Estimates from base regression without interaction with land. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
28 WORLD DEVELOPMENTof empowerment and crop production diversity, the
magnitudes are even higher; a 10% increase in the empow-
erment score leads to a 24% increase in calorie availability
(column 2) and a 13.6% increase in dietary diversity (col-
umn 4), although as mentioned above, these elasticities are
imprecisely estimated. Among the component indicators,
the largest elasticities are with respect to women’s rights
over assets (0.027 for calorie availability and 0.022 for diet
diversity) and women’s ownership of assets (0.026 for
calorie availability and 0.021 for diet diversity) for the
OLS estimates. 11 We also ﬁnd that most of the empower-
ment indicators have larger eﬀects on calorie availability
and dietary diversity than the selected household variables,
for both OLS and IV estimates. For example, based on
the OLS estimates, we ﬁnd that a 10% increase in the assets
owned by the woman has an eﬀect of increasing calorieavailability by 2.6%. However, the same proportional
increase in the number of food crops, years of education
of household head, and area of land owned lead to respec-
tive increases of 1.8%, 0.09%, and 0.11% in calorie availabil-
ity. The relative magnitudes of empowerment elasticities
compared to household characteristics are similar for the
IV elasticities.
The magnitudes of the eﬀects of the empowerment indica-
tors on adult BMI are relatively smaller than the eﬀects on
the other food security outcomes; the OLS elasticities range
from 0.001 (eﬀect of number of groups women is active in
on female BMI) to 0.008 (eﬀect of overall empowerment on
female BMI). For both OLS and IV estimates, we also ﬁnd
that the impacts of various indicators of empowerment on
BMI are relatively smaller than that of other household char-
acteristics.
Table 9. Estimates from household food security and individual nutrition status regressions with land interactions
Variable Per capita calorie
availability
Household dietary
diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 1: Women’s empowerment score
Empowerment score of woman 236.420*** 878.890*** 0.575*** 2.244*** 0.222 0.432 0.253 0.577
(50.699) (184.769) (0.131) (0.460) (0.225) (0.841) (0.282) (0.948)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 29.371 3.467 0.113** 0.181 0.059 0.082 0.136 0.494
(23.518) (75.926) (0.050) (0.150) (0.104) (0.312) (0.131) (0.385)
Empowerment score of woman  Ln (owned
cultivable land + 1)
1.438 49.081 0.112 0.206 0.140 0.349 0.005 0.926
(31.270) (112.493) (0.068) (0.219) (0.141) (0.460) (0.180) (0.564)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
F 40.566 37.049 25.761 24.237 12.348 12.153 14.587 14.472
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.225 0.176 0.122 0.113 0.112 0.105 0.093
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.231 0.446 0.526 0.630
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 20.703 20.703 19.911 19.682
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.643 0.562
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.633 0.551
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000 0.000 0.962 0.192
Model 2: Women’s group membership
Number of groups woman is an active member of 48.466** 692.446*** 0.162*** 1.719*** 0.301*** 0.320 0.173 0.262
(24.499) (170.405) (0.063) (0.433) (0.109) (0.645) (0.132) (0.758)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 32.219*** 32.722 0.059*** 0.092* 0.135*** 0.111 0.189*** 0.042
(9.388) (27.536) (0.018) (0.053) (0.044) (0.104) (0.049) (0.127)
Number of groups woman is an active member
of  Ln (owned cultivable land + 1)
15.431 34.626 0.088** 0.101 0.061 0.165 0.232** 0.756
(18.423) (119.194) (0.038) (0.214) (0.077) (0.407) (0.091) (0.519)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
F 39.023 30.405 25.014 20.564 12.741 12.188 14.875 13.992
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.050 0.173 0.045 0.115 0.114 0.107 0.063
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.108 0.368 0.313 0.473
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 5.229 5.229 4.380 5.327
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.407
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.485 0.394
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000 0.000 0.992 0.117
Model 3: Women’s decisions on credit
Average number of decisions over credit 4.529 705.155*** 0.006 0.659 0.112** 0.655 0.005 1.139
(11.728) (253.810) (0.031) (0.462) (0.053) (0.718) (0.066) (0.945)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 33.918*** 152.357* 0.056** 0.155 0.185*** 0.289 0.217*** 0.003
(12.219) (88.380) (0.023) (0.132) (0.052) (0.376) (0.062) (0.400)
Average number of decisions over credit  Ln (owned
cultivable land + 1)
6.854 149.154 0.022 0.139 0.034 0.143 0.094** 0.160
(8.167) (97.669) (0.016) (0.147) (0.037) (0.411) (0.043) (0.445)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
F 39.136 18.759 24.735 21.297 12.426 10.937 14.740 13.267
Adjusted R2 0.269 0.539 0.171 0.030 0.115 0.065 0.107 0.019
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.334 0.032 0.415 0.533
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.269 0.269 0.452 0.190
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 1.000 1.000 0.794 1.135
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.516 0.501
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.506 0.490
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000 0.029 0.878 0.279
Model 4: Women’s ownership of assets
Number of assets woman has self/joint ownership of 38.631*** 174.917*** 0.118*** 0.231*** 0.042 0.012 0.066 0.141
(9.214) (35.279) (0.021) (0.083) (0.039) (0.154) (0.047) (0.183)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 42.827*** 156.687** 0.074*** 0.164 0.181*** 0.311 0.175** 0.037
(13.099) (76.327) (0.029) (0.112) (0.065) (0.254) (0.073) (0.333)
Number of assets woman has self/joint ownership
of  Ln (owned cultivable land + 1)
6.962 59.385* 0.018* 0.058 0.013 0.075 0.019 0.078
(4.683) (33.890) (0.010) (0.050) (0.024) (0.118) (0.028) (0.150)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
(continued on next page)
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Table 9—Continued
Variable Per capita calorie
availability
Household dietary
diversity
Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
F 39.678 34.728 26.469 24.045 12.349 11.876 14.717 14.383
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.201 0.180 0.164 0.113 0.107 0.106 0.096
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.703 0.243 0.465 0.580
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.013
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 2.085 2.085 2.261 2.052
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.001 0.623 0.656
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.001 0.612 0.646
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000 0.059 0.899 0.274
Model 5: Women’s rights over assets
Number of self/joint decisions over purchase, sale, or
transfer of assets made by woman
6.045*** 23.091*** 0.019*** 0.027** 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.009
(1.337) (5.225) (0.003) (0.013) (0.006) (0.023) (0.007) (0.028)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 30.912** 126.288 0.061** 0.334* 0.128** 0.481* 0.088 0.226
Number of self/joint decisions over purchase, sale, or
transfer of assets made by woman  Ln (owned
cultivable land + 1)
(12.666) (78.503) (0.027) (0.184) (0.060) (0.284) (0.068) (0.405)
0.351 7.580 0.002 0.022* 0.002 0.024 0.003 0.007
(0.789) (5.522) (0.001) (0.013) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.029)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
F 39.768 35.436 27.011 22.323 12.319 11.515 14.612 14.541
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.223 0.181 0.131 0.113 0.088 0.106 0.100
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.165 0.316 0.583 0.474
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.238 0.238 0.134 0.234
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 1.156 1.156 1.376 1.164
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.001 0.623 0.656
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.001 0.612 0.646
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.006 0.086 0.633 0.553
Model 6: Women’s gender parity gap
Gender parity gap (= 0 if woman enjoys gender
parity, “gap” if not)
161.629*** 1,335.018*** 0.380*** 2.855*** 0.342 0.876 0.268 1.200
(54.641) (281.034) (0.145) (0.694) (0.258) (1.227) (0.321) (1.361)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 29.784*** 37.863 0.044** 0.040 0.186*** 0.252** 0.121** 0.366***
(10.399) (28.102) (0.022) (0.054) (0.050) (0.114) (0.058) (0.136)
Gender parity (= 0 if woman enjoys gender parity,
“gap” if not)  Ln (owned cultivable land + 1)
3.094 14.139 0.030 0.068 0.174 0.541 0.071 1.285*
(37.327) (144.634) (0.076) (0.296) (0.154) (0.576) (0.211) (0.718)
Observations 3,213 3,213 3,213 3,213 3,094 3,094 3,203 3,203
F 38.725 32.434 25.290 22.113 12.065 11.746 14.718 14.468
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.158 0.173 0.077 0.111 0.109 0.107 0.090
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.473 0.213 0.607 0.770
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 11.450 11.450 10.940 10.691
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.689 0.640
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000 0.000 0.679 0.629
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000 0.000 0.890 0.147
Source: Estimated by authors using data from the IFPRI Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey, 2011–12.
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
30 WORLD DEVELOPMENTAlthough the results of the elasticities analysis point to
the importance of women’s empowerment in general, and
women’s asset ownership in particular, for improving
household food security, they do not yield conclusive evi-
dence that prioritizing women’s empowerment alone should
take precedence over improving other determinants of food
security. The magnitudes of the elasticity estimates, even
where signiﬁcant, are small. Moreover, one must recognizethe limitations of elasticity analyses in general, because elas-
ticities isolate the eﬀects of a single variable, whereas food
security is determined by the interaction of many variables,
not just women’s empowerment. This analysis also does not
indicate, in practice, how increases in these underlying vari-
ables are to be achieved. Because our elasticity estimates
were computed at the sample means, they may not be
indicative of diﬀerential responses across the empowerment
Table 10. Elasticities of calorie availability, dietary diversity, and adult BMI with respect to empowerment indicators and other household characteristics
Variable Per capita calorie availability Household dietary diversity Male BMI Female BMI
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9)
Empowerment score of woman 0.063*** 0.240 0.035*** 0.136 0.004 0.015 0.008 0.001
(0.013) (224.877) (0.008) (139.752) (0.007) (125.432) (0.009) (138.552)
Number of groups woman is an active
member of
0.005* 0.107 0.004* 0.058 0.004** 0.002 0.001 0.008
(0.003) (118.956) (0.002) (70.462) (0.002) (52.659) (0.002) (57.681)
Average number of decisions over credit 0.000 0.310 0.002 0.094 0.006*** 0.028 0.003 0.041
(0.004) (584.159) (0.003) (264.171) (0.002) (179.205) (0.003) (221.669)
Number of assets woman has self/joint
ownership of
0.026*** 0.115 0.021*** 0.037 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.013
(0.007) (126.640) (0.004) (77.334) (0.003) (68.572) (0.004) (78.939)
Number of self/joint decisions over
purchase, sale, or transfer of assets made
by woman
0.027*** 0.094 0.022*** 0.020 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.006) (118.856) (0.004) (75.924) (0.003) (64.359) (0.004) (77.964)
Gender parity (= 0 if woman enjoys
gender parity, “gap” if not)
0.011*** 0.086 0.007*** 0.045 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (83.338) (0.002) (51.081) (0.002) (45.363) (0.002) (48.585)
Range of elasticity estimates for other household characteristics
Number of food crops produced by
household
0.017***–0.020*** 0.019–0.021 0.009***–0.011*** (0.018–0.026) 0.006**–0.005** 0.006–0.001 0.002–0.003 0.007–0.001
(0.005) (134.99–58.31) (0.003) (35.957–60.373) (0.002) (31.487–36.018) (0.003) (37.044–51.617)
Years of education of household head 0.009***–0.011*** 0.005–0.021 0.022***–0.023*** 0.021–0.026 0.017***–0.018*** 0.017–0.018 0.016***–0.017*** 0.016–0.018
(0.004) (19.39–36.018) (0.002) (11.434–16.385) (0.002) (10.652–12.662) (0.003) (14.342–16.210)
Area of cultivable land owned by
household (in decimals)
0.010***–0.012*** 0.008–0.017 0.003*–0.004** 0.003–0.007 0.007***–0.008*** 0.008 0.006*** 0.006–0.007
(0.003) (16.887–26.744) (0.002) (8.864–11.183) (0.002) (9.369–9.762) (0.002) (10.255–10.844)
Observations* 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,150 3,150 3,263 3,263
Source: Estimated by authors using data from the IFPRI Bangladesh Integrated Household Survey, 2011–12.
Note: Calculated from base regressions without land interactions, and evaluated at the mean. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For analyses involving the gender parity variable, the number of
observations is reduced to 3,213 for calorie availability and household dietary diversity, 3,094 for male BMI, and 3,203 for female BMI.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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32 WORLD DEVELOPMENTor wealth distribution. This can be explored in future
work.5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper has demonstrated that the recently developed
WEAI can be used not only to assess the extent of women’s
empowerment in agriculture, but also to identify areas where
the gaps in empowerment are greatest. By decomposing the
WEAI into its component domains and indicators, we have
identiﬁed that the domains of leadership in the community
and control of resources are the most promising areas for pol-
icy intervention. Our analysis has also highlighted the impor-
tance of increasing the number of groups in which women
actively participate and increasing women’s control of assets.
To what extent are the strategic and programmatic priorities
of government and civil society aligned with closing empower-
ment gaps, speciﬁcally in these areas of greatest disempower-
ment? Because the NGO sector has emerged as an important
alternative delivery channel for social services, and provides
complementary avenues for poor women to access basic ser-
vices alongside state-run services (Nazneen, Hossain, &
Sultan, 2011), we consider both government and civil society
initiatives in answering this question.
These empowerment gaps must be taken in the context of
the country’s impressive gains in women’s health and girls’
education relative to comparator countries in the past two dec-
ades (Nazneen et al., 2011), with rapid reduction in fertility
rates, infant and child mortality, and maternal mortality,
and the closing of the gender gap in primary and secondary
enrollment. Women’s economic and social advancement are
also stated goals of public policy, falling under the purview
of the Ministry of Women and Children Aﬀairs (MOWCA).
In assessing progress in implementing the government’s policy
commitments to gender equality, the MOWCA (2010) found
that the greatest emphasis of government ministries was on
improving the gender balance of staﬀ and working conditions
of women. However, less than a third of the ministries (14 out
of 47 responding to a questionnaire) identiﬁed economic
advancement as a programmatic area, and within this area,
women’s economic participation in the labor force was empha-
sized, not increasing control over assets or income derived
from economic activities. Protection of legal rights focused
on birth registration, eliminating child labor, and combating
early marriage and dowry-related violence, not on equal rights
to own assets. The only program that explicitly mentioned
strengthening women’s rights to assets was a program of the
Ministry of Land that leased out khash (government-owned)
land to wives and husbands on an equal rights basis in the
Model Village and Cluster Village Project (MOWCA, 2010,
p. 42).
With regard to leadership in the community, despite the two
top political leaders being women, Bangladeshi women in gen-
eral have fared far less well with respect to participation in
national politics than women in comparator countries
(Nazneen et al., 2011, p. 12). The established political parties
have tended to focus on conventional and uncontroversial
women’s issues such as maternal healthcare, girl’s education,
political participation, violence against women in the public
sphere, and certain forms of domestic violence such as
dowry-related violence (Nazneen et al., 2011, p. 24). Policy
documents and pronouncements on strengthening women’s
leadership in the community are quite vague, althoughMOWCA (2011, authors’ translation) mentions the role of
District Women Aﬀairs Oﬃcers and Upazilla Women Aﬀairs
Oﬃcers in implementing programs undertaken for the devel-
opment of women in the economic advancement ministries,
as well as a move to organize women into self-sustained
groups at the village and union levels, with the possibility of
registering these groups as formal organizations under diﬀer-
ent government organizations.
Donor policy documents do not highlight women’s partici-
pation in mass party politics as a route to women’s empower-
ment, but make greater reference to working with civil society
as a route to strengthening women’s voice at the local levels
(Nazneen et al., 2011). Nevertheless, civil society eﬀorts need
a supportive policy environment to be eﬀective, and often
work against deep-seated economic and social barriers to
women’s empowerment. While NGOs have been active in
increasing their membership base among poor rural women,
women with more bargaining power within their households
(owing to greater schooling or assets brought to marriage)
are more likely to participate in NGOs (Quisumbing, 2009).
Group-based eﬀorts have often been unable to reach the
ultra-poor, because many group-based activities, such as those
in microﬁnance, require a minimum level of resources for par-
ticipation, such as funds for the compulsory savings require-
ments.
Long-seated systems of property rights that favor men in
terms of inheritance, and the diﬃculty that women face in
accumulating assets that they can control, need to be
addressed so that women can build up their control of assets.
This suggests that reforms of inheritance and property rights
law more broadly, and speciﬁc interventions to increase
women’s control of assets, would be important parts of the
policy agenda to reduce gender inequality. These could include
targeted asset transfers to poor women (similar to those imple-
mented by BRAC through its Targeting the Ultra Poor [TUP]
Program) as well as eﬀorts to improve women’s access to
ﬁnancial instruments (both savings and credit) so they can
accumulate assets. However, even if assets are transferred to
women, a recent impact evaluation of BRAC’s TUP program
shows that there is no guarantee that they will retain control of
the transferred assets or other assets acquired from incomes
generated from the transferred assets (Das et al., 2013). While
the National Women’s Development Policy formulated by the
Ministry of Women and Children Aﬀairs aims to “ensure full
control of women of the property earned through own labor,
inheritance, debt, land and market management” (MOWCA,
2011, authors’ translation), it does not oﬀer speciﬁc pro-
nouncements about eﬀorts to reform property law to improve
gender equity. Our ﬁnding that not only absolute empower-
ment, but the relative empowerment of women within house-
holds, also positively aﬀects household food security
provides additional support for policies to narrow the gender
gap in Bangladesh.
Our results also highlight the importance of investing in the
agricultural sector as a whole to increase production diversity.
The BIHS results show that about 77% of the total cropped
area in Bangladesh is under rice cultivation, implying very
little crop diversity (Ahmed et al., 2013). Signiﬁcant advances
in agricultural research have focused mainly on rice. Our
ﬁndings call for increased investment in agricultural research
to enhance productivity of nonrice food crops such as pulses,
vegetables, and fruits. The positive impacts of tube-well
ownership and access to electricity also suggest that invest-
ments in complementary infrastructure will be important to
WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT IN AGRICULTURE: WHAT ROLE FOR FOOD SECURITY IN BANGLADESH? 33increase household-level food energy availability and dietary
diversity. Lastly, continued investments in schooling, particu-
larly of women and girls, will be important not only toincrease food security, but also to narrow the gender gap in
human capital.NOTES1. This description draws from Alkire et al. (2013).
2. The WEAI is a weighted sum of the 5DE and GPI with weights 0.9
and 0.1, respectively.
3. We add the integer 1 to the land area variable to avoid losing
observations for households that do not own land but are involved in
agriculture, such as cultivators who rent in land or agricultural wage
laborers.
4. As discussed below, the gender parity gap is equal to zero if the
women’s score is equal to or exceeds the man’s 5DE score.
5. Alternatively, calorie availability can be expressed in terms of per
adult equivalents. Results for both per capita and per adult equivalent
calorie availability are qualitatively similar, hence we focus our discussion
on the per capita indicator. Results for per adult equivalent calorie
availability are available upon request.
6. For households where information on the woman’s spouse was not
available (in female-headed households—where the male spouse is amigrant, or the female is widowed/separated), we considered the age
diﬀerence to be zero.
7. The household head is the self-identiﬁed primary decisionmaker (in
most cases, male) in the sample household.
8. 100 decimals = 1 acre.
9. However, both of these regressions have weak instruments, and the
model is underidentiﬁed in the diet diversity regression with land
interactions.
10. For Models 2 and 3 (group membership and credit decisions,
respectively), instruments are weak in the calorie availability and diet
diversity regressions; in Model 5 (women’s rights over assets), the Hansen
J test rejects the null hypothesis that instruments are valid in the calorie
availability regression.
11. For the 2SLS elasticities, the largest are with respect to credit,
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Table 11. Model 1: Women’s empowerment score and per adult equivalent calorie availability
Variable Per adult equivalent calorie availability
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
Empowerment score of woman 288.921*** 1,100.588***
(62.155) (222.549)
Age (in years) of household head 15.973* 10.402
(8.263) (8.878)
Age-squared of household head 0.125 0.070
(0.091) (0.098)
Years of education of household head 10.697** 10.458**
(4.301) (4.359)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 113.970*** 128.657***
(34.050) (44.806)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 59.686 31.296
(49.750) (51.950)
Household size 96.703*** 91.121***
(11.207) (11.835)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 944.962*** 979.262***
(262.404) (273.466)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 957.435*** 1,031.235***
(245.035) (254.336)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 1,067.528*** 1,142.455***
(239.740) (248.049)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 1,333.262*** 1,336.144***
(201.741) (207.133)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 962.667*** 947.325***
(261.802) (271.576)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 502.199** 598.276**
(251.845) (259.839)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 401.619 533.342**
(258.228) (265.836)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 647.129** 710.284**
(293.254) (301.181)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 22.718 67.253
(328.560) (336.961)
Number of food crops produced by household 46.953*** 38.191
(11.552) (30.280)
Number of dairy cows owned 61.363*** 53.355***
(13.387) (14.755)
Price of rice (in taka) 4.741 1.389
(5.073) (5.225)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 37.980*** 39.720***
(10.885) (11.116)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 119.506*** 50.227
(34.431) (37.775)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 11.354 19.400
(29.507) (31.497)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Constant 4,008.168*** 3,575.073***
(282.009) (309.563)
Observations 3,273 3,273
F 18.594 17.909
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.142
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.249
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 41.798
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000
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Table 12. Model 2: Women’s group membership and per adult equivalent calorie availability
Variable Per adult equivalent calorie availability
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
Number of groups woman is an active member of 39.995 1,011.372***
(29.832) (239.083)
Age (in years) of household head 17.476** 6.028
(8.199) (9.824)
Age-squared of household head 0.139 0.006
(0.090) (0.108)
Years of education of household head 10.914** 14.206***
(4.328) (5.048)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 114.530*** 260.786***
(34.264) (65.482)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 68.076 24.998
(50.070) (64.499)
Household size 98.990*** 105.826***
(11.299) (13.857)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 938.293*** 1,077.981***
(262.295) (304.382)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 936.492*** 1,068.694***
(244.923) (284.688)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 1,050.085*** 1,274.973***
(239.413) (276.602)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 1,333.443*** 1,362.555***
(201.426) (223.404)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 965.285*** 902.220***
(262.363) (305.169)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 474.134* 624.870**
(251.455) (286.003)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 369.131 719.129**
(258.595) (299.521)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 627.778** 705.585**
(293.271) (328.111)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 10.805 109.119
(328.635) (366.097)
Number of food crops produced by household 49.533*** 29.971
(11.670) (35.764)
Number of dairy cows owned 64.982*** 84.957***
(13.406) (18.058)
Price of rice (in taka) 5.612 2.191
(5.090) (6.175)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 38.095*** 55.796***
(10.908) (13.124)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 139.763*** 34.338
(34.287) (46.058)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 21.148 6.788
(29.657) (35.679)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Constant 4,163.654*** 4,194.413***
(282.543) (328.194)
Observations 3,273 3,273
F 17.885 14.486
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.114
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.139
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 9.545
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000
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Table 13. Model 3: Women’s decisions on credit and per adult equivalent calorie availability
Variable Per adult equivalent calorie availability
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
Average number of decisions over credit 0.708 1,027.521**
(14.402) (401.662)
Age (in years) of household head 17.939** 24.216
(8.202) (21.245)
Age-squared of household head 0.144 0.303
(0.090) (0.228)
Years of education of household head 10.796** 21.710***
(4.324) (8.372)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 109.252*** 400.431***
(34.336) (144.593)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 69.687 30.409
(50.073) (87.412)
Household size 98.647*** 75.215***
(11.264) (21.770)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 933.490*** 1,597.502***
(262.141) (502.692)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 931.620*** 1,367.426***
(244.755) (424.807)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 1,041.299*** 1,620.248***
(239.507) (435.997)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 1,332.285*** 1,417.681***
(201.405) (298.223)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 968.710*** 1,338.570***
(261.872) (449.904)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 468.360* 850.318**
(251.659) (427.095)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 355.061 816.413*
(258.314) (431.648)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 624.856** 782.386*
(293.418) (455.422)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 7.230 328.691
(329.027) (503.181)
Number of food crops produced by household 49.655*** 42.081
(11.666) (69.803)
Number of dairy cows owned 64.319*** 113.342***
(13.431) (31.803)
Price of rice (in taka) Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 5.925 9.424
(5.105) (9.679)
37.347*** 25.983
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) (10.925) (17.453)
144.172*** 28.648
(34.116) (68.800)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 22.255 50.329
(29.700) (57.135)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Constant 4,162.139*** 3,988.850***
(282.790) (453.473)
Observations 3,273 3,273
F 17.874 7.937
Adjusted R2 0.182 1.168
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.493
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.031
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 2.134
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000
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Table 14. Model 4: Women’s ownership of assets and per adult equivalent calorie availability
Variable Per adult equivalent calorie availability
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
Number of assets woman has self/joint ownership of 41.559*** 189.051***
(10.811) (43.130)
Age (in years) of household head 16.361** 10.372
(8.237) (8.877)
Age-squared of household head 0.128 0.068
(0.090) (0.098)
Years of education of household head 9.465** 4.642
(4.262) (4.513)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 110.904*** 109.862**
(34.140) (44.649)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 59.261 24.061
(49.588) (52.467)
Household size 95.842*** 86.472***
(11.103) (11.908)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 927.938*** 902.982***
(261.784) (273.512)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 945.977*** 994.210***
(245.026) (256.835)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 1,073.065*** 1,186.169***
(240.366) (253.339)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 1,336.835*** 1,353.452***
(201.381) (207.939)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 983.747*** 1,029.984***
(261.416) (273.230)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 488.348* 557.852**
(252.290) (263.186)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 408.746 600.095**
(259.543) (273.361)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 662.078** 792.133**
(294.508) (311.385)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 53.322 214.165
(328.772) (342.280)
Number of food crops produced by household 45.946*** 41.259
(11.666) (31.116)
Number of dairy cows owned 60.145*** 43.693***
(13.469) (15.651)
Price of rice (in taka) 5.519 4.002
(5.076) (5.223)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 36.975*** 35.785***
(10.943) (11.411)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 132.612*** 89.240**
(34.057) (36.527)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 13.137 19.493
(29.650) (32.515)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Constant 4,141.097*** 4,067.797***
(281.072) (291.438)
Observations 3,273 3,273
F 18.424 17.421
Adjusted R2 0.187 0.124
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.421
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 32.199
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000
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Table 15. Model 5: Women’s rights over assets and per adult equivalent calorie availability
Variable Per adult equivalent calorie availability
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
Number of self/joint decisions over purchase, sale, or transfer of assets made by woman 7.245*** 26.026***
(1.608) (6.667)
Age (in years) of household head 15.113* 8.269
(8.191) (8.694)
Age-squared of household head 0.117 0.051
(0.089) (0.094)
Years of education of household head 9.414** 6.104
(4.268) (4.426)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 104.247*** 106.703**
(34.096) (44.759)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 53.798 8.818
(50.043) (55.687)
Household size 94.423*** 82.172***
(11.174) (12.416)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 962.297*** 1,051.624***
(261.313) (270.905)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 972.516*** 1,086.723***
(244.233) (254.127)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 1,098.210*** 1,248.829***
(239.742) (252.617)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 1,331.124*** 1,327.763***
(200.761) (202.752)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 994.523*** 1,077.834***
(261.021) (270.702)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 512.876** 633.592**
(251.372) (259.736)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 405.747 538.571**
(257.536) (264.839)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 665.151** 774.648**
(293.402) (304.696)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 49.298 165.824
(328.333) (337.034)
Number of food crops produced by household 44.191*** 12.833
(11.655) (35.275)
Number of dairy cows owned 58.818*** 48.088***
(13.489) (15.226)
Price of rice (in taka) 5.392 4.052
(5.089) (5.222)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 35.097*** 28.933**
(10.901) (11.316)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 140.838*** 136.027***
(33.882) (34.870)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 12.868 11.414
(29.650) (31.788)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Constant 4,169.338*** 4,184.153***
(281.672) (286.914)
Observations 3,273 3,273
F 18.554 17.749
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.146
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.054
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 23.334
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.005
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Table 16. Model 6: Gender parity gap and per adult equivalent calorie availability
Variable Per adult equivalent calorie availability
OLS 2SLS
(1) (2)
Gender parity gap (= 0 if woman enjoys gender parity, “gap” if not) 202.163*** 1,587.689***
(68.626) (329.406)
Age (in years) of household head 18.249** 10.480
(8.307) (9.346)
Age-squared of household head 0.146 0.070
(0.091) (0.102)
Years of education of household head 11.402*** 12.369***
(4.361) (4.573)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 107.653*** 116.313**
(34.280) (45.683)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 64.289 17.530
(50.398) (54.370)
Household size 97.454*** 87.890***
(11.309) (12.293)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 961.321*** 1,018.070***
(268.684) (291.725)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 971.213*** 1,062.934***
(250.239) (268.999)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 1,108.721*** 1,227.982***
(246.051) (264.550)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 1,367.198*** 1,375.799***
(206.764) (219.447)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 976.129*** 951.576***
(267.593) (288.082)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 539.342** 698.911**
(258.994) (277.511)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 402.919 576.229**
(264.948) (281.013)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 680.802** 788.806**
(300.308) (320.529)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 79.224 173.984
(335.533) (356.074)
Number of food crops produced by household 47.283*** 56.670*
(11.679) (30.744)
Number of dairy cows owned 62.398*** 53.946***
(13.419) (15.051)
Price of rice (in taka) 4.416 0.389
(5.015) (5.387)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 39.148*** 46.439***
(11.037) (11.624)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 132.292*** 52.323
(34.554) (39.078)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 12.989 18.801
(29.910) (32.642)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Constant 4,178.484*** 4,505.917***
(286.784) (316.963)
Observations 3,213 3,213
F 17.751 16.173
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.082
Hansen J p, Ho: instruments valid 0.291
Under ID test p, Ho: underidentiﬁed 0.000
Weak ID test stat (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F) 27.216
Anderson-Rubin, Ho: endogvars irrelevant
A-R Wald test, p-value 0.000
A-R Wald Chi2 test, p-value 0.000
Endogeneity test p, Ho: exogenous 0.000
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Table 17a. First Stage regressions (for models without interactions)
Table 3: Per capita calorie availability and household dietary diversity
Endogenous variable: empowerment
score of woman
Endogenous variable: number of
food crops produced by
household
coef/se coef/se
Age (in years) of household head 0.008*** 0.025**
(0.002) (0.011)
Age-squared of household head 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 0.000 0.010
(0.001) (0.008)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.025*** 0.508***
(0.010) (0.064)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.025* 0.189***
(0.014) (0.066)
Household size 0.009*** 0.062***
(0.003) (0.021)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 0.110 0.698*
(0.072) (0.411)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 0.138** 0.539
(0.064) (0.382)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 0.119* 0.277
(0.061) (0.367)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 0.031 0.076
(0.048) (0.272)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 0.045 0.875**
(0.069) (0.390)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 0.175*** 0.335
(0.064) (0.383)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 0.199*** 0.063
(0.065) (0.391)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 0.121 0.181
(0.074) (0.435)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 0.099 0.237
(0.079) (0.470)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 0.002 0.011
(0.003) (0.019)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.023*** 0.036
(0.008) (0.050)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.003* 0.003
(0.001) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows owned 0.011*** 0.138***
(0.003) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.065*** 0.195***
(0.010) (0.054)
Age diﬀerence (male–female) 0.003*** 0.004
(0.001) (0.005)
Types of informal credit sources in village 0.025*** 0.037***
(0.003) (0.014)
Whether female has participated in any community activity
during the previous year (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
0.102*** 0.039
(0.008) (0.046)
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.006 0.395***
(0.010) (0.061)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.031*** 0.537***
(0.012) (0.071)
% of land irrigated by household 0.001*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001)
Number of community activities woman has participated in
during the previous year
Whether homestead land has been inherited by woman (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
Constant 0.345*** 0.655
(0.081) (0.444)
Observations 3,273 3,213
F 23.598 50.101
Adjusted R2 0.180 0.314
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Table 17b. First Stage regressions (for models without interactions)
Table 4: Per capita calorie availability and household dietary diversity
Endogenous variable: number of
groups woman is an active member of
Endogenous variable: number of
food crops produced by household
coef/se coef/se
Age (in years) of household head 0.013*** 0.024**
(0.004) (0.011)
Age-squared of household head 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 0.003 0.009
(0.003) (0.007)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.151*** 0.514***
(0.021) (0.064)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.031 0.193***
(0.037) (0.064)
Household size 0.006 0.061***
(0.007) (0.021)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 0.197 0.682*
(0.150) (0.400)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 0.164 0.532
(0.134) (0.373)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 0.242* 0.269
(0.126) (0.358)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 0.045 0.061
(0.096) (0.264)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 0.021 0.858**
(0.145) (0.381)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 0.192 0.323
(0.136) (0.373)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 0.377*** 0.051
(0.135) (0.382)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 0.101 0.177
(0.154) (0.426)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 0.102 0.234
(0.168) (0.459)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 0.020*** 0.009
(0.006) (0.018)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.012 0.035
(0.019) (0.049)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.006** 0.003
(0.003) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows owned 0.018** 0.138***
(0.008) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.072*** 0.186***
(0.022) (0.054)
Age diﬀerence (male–female) 0.004** 0.004
(0.002) (0.005)
Types of informal credit sources in village 0.018*** 0.035**
(0.007) (0.014)
Whether female has participated in any community activity
during the previous year (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.020 0.406***
(0.023) (0.060)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.024 0.548***
(0.026) (0.071)
% of land irrigated by household 0.001*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001)
Number of community activities woman has participated in during
the previous year
0.059*** 0.032
(0.009) (0.022)
Whether homestead land has been inherited by woman
(= 1, 0 if otherwise)
Constant 0.174 0.621
(0.174) (0.432)
Observations 3,273 3,273
F 13.821 51.137
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.321
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Table 17c. First Stage regressions (for models without interactions)
Table 5: Per capita calorie availability and household dietary diversity
Endogenous variable: average
number of decisions over credit
Endogenous variable: number of
food crops produced by household
coef/se coef/se
Age (in years) of household head 0.044*** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.011)
Age-squared of household head 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 0.010** 0.009
(0.005) (0.008)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.252*** 0.514***
(0.042) (0.064)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.010 0.190***
(0.069) (0.065)
Household size 0.020 0.061***
(0.014) (0.021)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 0.625* 0.689*
(0.320) (0.399)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 0.421 0.529
(0.289) (0.373)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 0.553** 0.266
(0.276) (0.358)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 0.078 0.067
(0.213) (0.263)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 0.324 0.868**
(0.311) (0.380)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 0.369 0.328
(0.293) (0.372)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 0.468 0.041
(0.291) (0.381)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 0.161 0.178
(0.327) (0.425)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 0.312 0.240
(0.351) (0.459)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 0.013 0.010
(0.012) (0.018)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.063* 0.032
(0.037) (0.049)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.013** 0.003
(0.006) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows owned 0.037** 0.138***
(0.016) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.133*** 0.205***
(0.043) (0.054)
Age diﬀerence (male–female) 0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
Types of informal credit sources in village 0.046*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.014)
Whether female has participated in any community activity during
the previous year (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.071 0.402***
(0.045) (0.060)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.048 0.545***
(0.051) (0.071)
% of land irrigated by household 0.001* 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001)
Number of community activities woman has participated in during
the previous year
Whether homestead land has been inherited by woman (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
Constant 0.080 0.621
(0.346) (0.432)
Observations 3,273 3,273
F 8.188 51.785
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.320
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Table 17d. First Stage regressions (for models without interactions)
Table 6: Per capita calorie availability and household dietary diversity
Endogenous variable: number of assets
woman has self/joint ownership of
Endogenous variable: number of
food crops produced by household
coef/se coef/se
Age (in years) of household head 0.047*** 0.024**
(0.014) (0.011)
Age-squared of household head 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 0.032*** 0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.047 0.514***
(0.066) (0.064)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.164 0.190***
(0.106) (0.065)
Household size 0.077*** 0.061***
(0.028) (0.021)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 0.087 0.689*
(0.485) (0.399)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 0.606 0.529
(0.451) (0.373)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 0.855** 0.266
(0.429) (0.358)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 0.144 0.068
(0.328) (0.263)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 0.572 0.868**
(0.491) (0.380)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 0.654 0.329
(0.449) (0.372)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 1.457*** 0.041
(0.459) (0.381)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 1.032* 0.178
(0.550) (0.425)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 1.200** 0.240
(0.589) (0.459)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 0.016 0.010
(0.019) (0.018)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.185*** 0.032
(0.056) (0.049)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.001 0.003
(0.009) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows owned 0.115*** 0.138***
(0.026) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.308*** 0.204***
(0.068) (0.054)
Age diﬀerence (male–female) 0.017** 0.004
(0.007) (0.005)
Types of informal credit sources in village 0.247*** 0.040***
(0.018) (0.014)
Whether female has participated in any community activity
during the previous year (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.082 0.402***
(0.068) (0.060)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.042 0.545***
(0.075) (0.071)
% of land irrigated by household 0.002** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001)
Number of community activities woman has participated in
during the previous year
Whether homestead land has been inherited by woman (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.388** 0.007
(0.162) (0.093)
Constant 0.699 0.621
(0.548) (0.433)
Observations 3,273 3,273
F 16.033 50.174
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.320
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Table 17e. First Stage regressions (for models without interactions)
Table 7: Per capita calorie availability and household dietary diversity
Endogenous variable: number of self/
joint decisions over purchase, sale, or
transfer of assets made by woman
Endogenous variable: number
of food crops produced by
household
coef/se coef/se
Age (in years) of household head 0.431*** 0.024**
(0.087) (0.011)
Age-squared of household head 0.004*** 0.000**
(0.001) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 0.167*** 0.009
(0.051) (0.008)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.348 0.514***
(0.434) (0.064)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 1.624** 0.190***
(0.660) (0.065)
Household size 0.613*** 0.061***
(0.146) (0.021)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 4.709 0.689*
(2.914) (0.399)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 6.588** 0.529
(2.749) (0.373)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 7.819*** 0.266
(2.690) (0.358)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 0.171 0.068
(1.996) (0.263)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 4.625 0.868**
(2.864) (0.380)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 6.719** 0.329
(2.683) (0.372)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 7.599*** 0.041
(2.756) (0.381)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 6.320* 0.178
(3.228) (0.425)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 6.966** 0.240
(3.518) (0.459)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 0.390*** 0.010
(0.128) (0.018)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 1.285*** 0.032
(0.351) (0.049)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.005 0.003
(0.056) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows owned 0.766*** 0.138***
(0.169) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.939** 0.204***
(0.397) (0.054)
Age diﬀerence (male–female) 0.051 0.004
(0.043) (0.005)
Types of informal credit sources in village 1.571*** 0.040***
(0.122) (0.014)
Whether female has participated in any community activity
during the previous year (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 1.668*** 0.402***
(0.430) (0.060)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 3.036*** 0.545***
(0.518) (0.071)
% of land irrigated by household 0.010** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.001)
Number of community activities woman has participated in during the previous year
Whether homestead land has been inherited by woman (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 2.791*** 0.007
(1.006) (0.093)
Constant 8.626*** 0.621
(3.226) (0.433)
Observations 3,273 3,273
F 18.802 50.174
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.320
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Table 17f. First Stage regressions (for models without interactions)
Table 8: Per capita calorie availability and household dietary diversity
Endogenous variable gender parity
gap (= 0 if woman enjoys gender
parity, “gap” if not)
Endogenous variable: number
of food crops produced by
household
coef/se coef/se
Age (in years) of household head 0.006*** 0.025**
(0.002) (0.011)
Age-squared of household head 0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of household head 0.001 0.010
(0.001) (0.008)
Household head is farmer (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.019** 0.508***
(0.008) (0.064)
Household head is trader (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.028** 0.189***
(0.012) (0.066)
Household size 0.009*** 0.062***
(0.003) (0.021)
Proportion of males 0–4 years old 0.102 0.698*
(0.066) (0.411)
Proportion of males 5–10 years old 0.114** 0.539
(0.058) (0.382)
Proportion of males 11–18 years old 0.114** 0.277
(0.055) (0.367)
Proportion of males 19–59 years old 0.029 0.076
(0.043) (0.272)
Proportion of females 0–4 years old 0.040 0.875**
(0.064) (0.390)
Proportion of females 5–10 years old 0.164*** 0.335
(0.058) (0.383)
Proportion of females 11–18 years old 0.156*** 0.063
(0.058) (0.391)
Proportion of females 19–59 years old 0.116* 0.181
(0.066) (0.435)
Proportion of females 60 years and older 0.105 0.237
(0.070) (0.470)
Ln (owned cultivable land + 1) 0.005** 0.011
(0.002) (0.019)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.013* 0.036
(0.007) (0.050)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows owned 0.005* 0.138***
(0.003) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.042*** 0.195***
(0.008) (0.054)
Age diﬀerence (male–female) 0.002** 0.004
(0.001) (0.005)
Types of informal credit sources in village 0.021*** 0.037***
(0.003) (0.014)
Whether female has participated in any community activity
during the previous year (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
0.059*** 0.039
(0.007) (0.046)
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.009 0.395***
(0.009) (0.061)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0 if otherwise) 0.039*** 0.537***
(0.011) (0.071)
% of land irrigated by household 0.000*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001)
Number of community activities woman has participated in during
the previous year
Whether homestead land has been inherited by woman (= 1, 0 if otherwise)
Constant 0.377*** 0.655
(0.076) (0.444)
Observations 3,213 3,213
F 12.367 50.101
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.314
46 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 17g. First stage regressions
Table 3: Male BMI Table 4: Male BMI Table 5: Male BMI
First stage regression results
Endogenous
variable:
empowerment
score of woman
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: number
of groups woman
is an active
member of
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: average
number of
decisions over
credit
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Age (in years) of member 0.008*** 0.024** 0.014*** 0.023** 0.045*** 0.023**
(0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
Age-squared of member 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of
member
0.000 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.010** 0.010
(0.001) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Household head is farmer
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.023** 0.495*** 0.155*** 0.502*** 0.262*** 0.502***
(0.010) (0.065) (0.021) (0.065) (0.042) (0.065)
Household head is trader
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.028* 0.192*** 0.031 0.196*** 0.003 0.193***
(0.015) (0.068) (0.038) (0.066) (0.070) (0.066)
Household size 0.009*** 0.068*** 0.003 0.067*** 0.027* 0.066***
(0.003) (0.022) (0.007) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022)
Proportion of males
0–4 years old
0.111 0.835* 0.233 0.812* 0.674** 0.819*
(0.073) (0.434) (0.154) (0.426) (0.330) (0.425)
Proportion of males
5–10 years old
0.122* 0.631 0.199 0.617 0.435 0.617
(0.065) (0.401) (0.138) (0.396) (0.299) (0.395)
Proportion of males
11–18 years old
0.104* 0.348 0.285** 0.336 0.656** 0.334
(0.062) (0.388) (0.131) (0.381) (0.285) (0.381)
Proportion of males
19–59 years old
0.018 0.163 0.050 0.144 0.051 0.152
(0.049) (0.287) (0.100) (0.281) (0.221) (0.280)
Proportion of females
0–4 years old
0.036 1.005** 0.018 0.981** 0.354 0.990**
(0.071) (0.411) (0.150) (0.403) (0.320) (0.402)
Proportion of females
5–10 years old
0.165** 0.451 0.215 0.434 0.425 0.440
(0.066) (0.401) (0.140) (0.394) (0.302) (0.393)
Proportion of females
11–18 years old
0.195*** 0.143 0.421*** 0.124 0.517* 0.116
(0.067) (0.412) (0.139) (0.405) (0.300) (0.405)
Proportion of females
19–59 years old
0.092 0.245 0.120 0.235 0.192 0.238
(0.077) (0.470) (0.161) (0.464) (0.343) (0.463)
Proportion of females
60 years and older
0.081 0.397 0.169 0.387 0.414 0.393
(0.082) (0.493) (0.177) (0.485) (0.366) (0.485)
Ln (owned cultivable
land + 1)
0.002 0.017 0.019*** 0.014 0.015 0.016
(0.003) (0.019) (0.006) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019)
Access to electricity
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.025*** 0.050 0.019 0.048 0.080** 0.045
(0.008) (0.051) (0.019) (0.051) (0.038) (0.050)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.003** 0.004 0.007** 0.004 0.012** 0.004
(0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows
owned
0.012*** 0.139*** 0.019** 0.139*** 0.039** 0.140***
(0.003) (0.029) (0.008) (0.029) (0.016) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.062*** 0.195*** 0.075*** 0.187*** 0.147*** 0.204***
(0.010) (0.056) (0.023) (0.055) (0.044) (0.055)
Age diﬀerence (male–female) 0.002* 0.003 0.006** 0.003 0.007 0.003
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Types of informal credit
sources in village
0.025*** 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.036** 0.047*** 0.040***
(0.003) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
Whether female has
participated in any
community activity during
the previous year (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
0.103*** 0.035
(0.008) (0.047)
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
0.005 0.388*** 0.015 0.399*** 0.078* 0.395***
(0.010) (0.062) (0.024) (0.061) (0.046) (0.062)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
0.030*** 0.530*** 0.024 0.541*** 0.041 0.538***
(0.012) (0.072) (0.026) (0.072) (0.052) (0.072)
(continued on next page)
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Table 17g—Continued
Table 3: Male BMI Table 4: Male BMI Table 5: Male BMI
First stage regression results
Endogenous
variable:
empowerment
score of woman
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: number
of groups woman
is an active
member of
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: average
number of
decisions over
credit
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
% of land irrigated by
household
0.001*** 0.010*** 0.001*** 0.010*** 0.001* 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of community
activities woman has
participated in during the
previous year
0.055*** 0.030
(0.009) (0.022)
Whether homestead land has
been inherited by woman
(= 1, 0 if otherwise)
Constant 0.365*** 0.569 0.184 0.540 0.048 0.538
(0.084) (0.465) (0.180) (0.456) (0.356) (0.456)
Observations 3,150 3,094 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150
F 22.910 49.278 13.134 50.233 8.539 50.666
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.310 0.108 0.317 0.063 0.317
Table 17h. First stage regressions
Table 6: Male BMI Table 7: Male BMI Table 8: Male BMI
First-stage regression results
Endogenous
variable: number
of assets woman
has self/joint
ownership of
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: number of
self/joint decisions
over purchase, sale,
or transfer of assets
made by woman
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: gender
parity gap (= 0 if
woman enjoys
gender parity, “gap”
if not)
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Age (in years) of member 0.041*** 0.023** 0.440*** 0.023** 0.006*** 0.024**
(0.014) (0.011) (0.089) (0.011) (0.002) (0.011)
Age-squared of member 0.000*** 0.000** 0.004*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of
member
0.032*** 0.010 0.166*** 0.010 0.001 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.051) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008)
Household head is
farmer (= 1, 0
otherwise)
0.003 0.502*** 0.512 0.502*** 0.016* 0.495***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.437) (0.065) (0.009) (0.065)
Household head is trader
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.212** 0.193*** 1.755*** 0.193*** 0.031*** 0.192***
(0.106) (0.066) (0.665) (0.066) (0.012) (0.068)
Household size 0.065** 0.066*** 0.624*** 0.066*** 0.009*** 0.068***
(0.028) (0.022) (0.149) (0.022) (0.003) (0.022)
Proportion of males
0–4 years old
0.315 0.819* 3.089 0.819* 0.099 0.835*
(0.483) (0.425) (2.986) (0.425) (0.069) (0.434)
Proportion of males
5–10 years old
0.129 0.617 4.592* 0.617 0.095 0.631
(0.443) (0.395) (2.789) (0.395) (0.061) (0.401)
Proportion of males
11–18 years old
0.478 0.334 5.937** 0.334 0.098* 0.348
(0.425) (0.381) (2.753) (0.381) (0.058) (0.388)
Proportion of males
19–59 years old
0.138 0.151 1.493 0.151 0.013 0.163
(0.324) (0.280) (2.037) (0.280) (0.045) (0.287)
Proportion of females
0–4 years old
0.125 0.990** 2.746 0.990** 0.031 1.005**
(0.490) (0.402) (2.921) (0.402) (0.066) (0.411)
(continued on next page)
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Table 17h—Continued
Table 6: Male BMI Table 7: Male BMI Table 8: Male BMI
First-stage regression results
Endogenous
variable: number
of assets woman
has self/joint
ownership of
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: number of
self/joint decisions
over purchase, sale,
or transfer of assets
made by woman
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: gender
parity gap (= 0 if
woman enjoys
gender parity, “gap”
if not)
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proportion of females
5–10 years old
0.236 0.440 4.997* 0.440 0.145** 0.451
(0.444) (0.393) (2.740) (0.393) (0.061) (0.401)
Proportion of females
11–18 years old
0.949** 0.116 5.302* 0.116 0.138** 0.143
(0.450) (0.405) (2.800) (0.405) (0.061) (0.412)
Proportion of females
19–59 years old
0.320 0.238 2.930 0.238 0.086 0.245
(0.540) (0.463) (3.331) (0.463) (0.071) (0.470)
Proportion of females
60 years and older
0.521 0.393 4.186 0.393 0.078 0.397
(0.573) (0.485) (3.593) (0.485) (0.075) (0.493)
Ln (owned cultivable
land + 1)
0.003 0.016 0.374*** 0.016 0.005** 0.017
(0.019) (0.019) (0.130) (0.019) (0.002) (0.019)
Access to electricity
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.163*** 0.045 1.206*** 0.045 0.013* 0.050
(0.056) (0.050) (0.357) (0.050) (0.008) (0.051)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.003 0.004 0.028 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.009) (0.007) (0.057) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-
eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows
owned
0.125*** 0.140*** 0.825*** 0.140*** 0.006** 0.139***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.171) (0.029) (0.003) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.303*** 0.204*** 0.781* 0.204*** 0.041*** 0.195***
(0.068) (0.055) (0.402) (0.055) (0.008) (0.056)
Age diﬀerence (male–
female)
0.005 0.003 0.026 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.045) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
Types of informal credit
sources in village
0.251*** 0.040*** 1.615*** 0.040*** 0.021*** 0.039***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.124) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015)
Whether female has
participated in any
community activity
during the previous year
(= 1, 0 if otherwise)
0.060*** 0.035
(0.007) (0.047)
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
0.106 0.395*** 1.830*** 0.395*** 0.008 0.388***
(0.068) (0.062) (0.438) (0.062) (0.009) (0.062)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0
if otherwise)
0.028 0.538*** 3.035*** 0.538*** 0.038*** 0.530***
(0.075) (0.072) (0.523) (0.072) (0.011) (0.072)
% of land irrigated by
household
0.002** 0.010*** 0.009** 0.010*** 0.000*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Number of community
activities woman has
participated in during
the previous year
Whether homestead land
has been inherited by
woman (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
0.348** 0.000 2.652*** 0.000
(0.161) (0.096) (1.028) (0.096)
Constant 0.151 0.538 6.428* 0.538 0.355*** 0.569
(0.541) (0.457) (3.289) (0.457) (0.079) (0.465)
Observations 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,094 3,094
F 16.150 49.106 19.040 49.106 11.649 49.278
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.316 0.190 0.316 0.118 0.310
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Table 17i. First stage regressions
Table 3: Female BMI Table 4: Female BMI Table 5: Female BMI
First stage regression results
Endogenous
variable:
empowerment
score of woman
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: number
of groups woman
is an active
member of
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: average
number of
decisions over
credit
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Pregnant (= 1, 0
otherwise)
0.004 0.131 0.001 0.111 0.113 0.109
(0.021) (0.116) (0.045) (0.112) (0.099) (0.112)
Lactating (= 1, 0
otherwise)
0.022* 0.086 0.004 0.087 0.039 0.085
(0.013) (0.074) (0.030) (0.073) (0.061) (0.073)
Age (in years) of member 0.012*** 0.017 0.019*** 0.016 0.050*** 0.016
(0.003) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Age-squared of member 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of
member
0.004*** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.002
(0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
Household head is
farmer (= 1, 0
otherwise)
0.027*** 0.522*** 0.154*** 0.528*** 0.257*** 0.528***
(0.009) (0.063) (0.021) (0.063) (0.042) (0.063)
Household head is trader
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.022 0.167** 0.032 0.172*** 0.009 0.169***
(0.015) (0.066) (0.038) (0.065) (0.069) (0.065)
Household size 0.009*** 0.062*** 0.004 0.062*** 0.022 0.061***
(0.003) (0.021) (0.007) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021)
Proportion of males
0–4 years old
0.142* 0.729* 0.215 0.719* 0.617* 0.725*
(0.074) (0.426) (0.155) (0.416) (0.331) (0.415)
Proportion of males
5–10 years old
0.125* 0.462 0.166 0.455 0.480* 0.457
(0.064) (0.376) (0.134) (0.367) (0.288) (0.366)
Proportion of males
11–18 years old
0.098 0.171 0.225* 0.163 0.580** 0.166
(0.061) (0.359) (0.126) (0.349) (0.274) (0.349)
Proportion of males
19–59 years old
0.029 0.016 0.061 0.033 0.177 0.022
(0.047) (0.269) (0.096) (0.260) (0.208) (0.259)
Proportion of females
0–4 years old
0.069 0.927** 0.009 0.913** 0.340 0.922**
(0.071) (0.399) (0.149) (0.391) (0.320) (0.390)
Proportion of females
5–10 years old
0.154** 0.249 0.180 0.239 0.405 0.250
(0.064) (0.378) (0.136) (0.368) (0.292) (0.366)
Proportion of females
11–18 years old
0.185*** 0.043 0.374*** 0.054 0.507* 0.059
(0.065) (0.383) (0.136) (0.374) (0.290) (0.373)
Proportion of females
19–59 years old
0.088 0.046 0.080 0.038 0.204 0.046
(0.073) (0.437) (0.153) (0.428) (0.328) (0.427)
Proportion of females
60 years and older
0.100 0.166 0.146 0.161 0.466 0.169
(0.080) (0.475) (0.170) (0.464) (0.354) (0.464)
Ln (owned cultivable
land + 1)
0.002 0.018 0.021*** 0.015 0.010 0.017
(0.003) (0.019) (0.006) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018)
Access to electricity
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.018** 0.024 0.012 0.023 0.060 0.020
(0.008) (0.049) (0.019) (0.049) (0.038) (0.048)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.003* 0.004 0.006** 0.004 0.012** 0.003
(0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-
eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows
owned
0.011*** 0.142*** 0.017** 0.141*** 0.036** 0.142***
(0.003) (0.029) (0.008) (0.029) (0.016) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.064*** 0.197*** 0.071*** 0.188*** 0.127*** 0.206***
(0.010) (0.055) (0.022) (0.054) (0.043) (0.054)
Age diﬀerence (male–
female)
0.002** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.005 0.000
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Types of informal credit
sources in village
0.024*** 0.035** 0.017** 0.032** 0.044*** 0.037**
(0.003) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Whether female has
participated in any
community activity
during the previous year
(= 1, 0 if otherwise)
0.099*** 0.034
(0.008) (0.046)
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Table 17i—Continued
Table 3: Female BMI Table 4: Female BMI Table 5: Female BMI
First stage regression results
Endogenous
variable:
empowerment
score of woman
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: number
of groups woman
is an active
member of
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: average
number of
decisions over
credit
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
0.010 0.396*** 0.023 0.407*** 0.057 0.403***
(0.010) (0.062) (0.023) (0.061) (0.045) (0.061)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0
if otherwise)
0.034*** 0.554*** 0.025 0.566*** 0.040 0.562***
(0.012) (0.071) (0.026) (0.071) (0.051) (0.071)
% of land irrigated by
household
0.001*** 0.010*** 0.001*** 0.010*** 0.001** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Number of community
activities woman has
participated in during
the previous year
0.058*** 0.032
(0.009) (0.022)
Whether homestead land
has been inherited by
woman (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
Constant 0.321*** 0.542 0.212 0.506 0.068 0.509
(0.083) (0.460) (0.178) (0.448) (0.359) (0.448)
Observations 3,263 3,203 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,263
F 22.916 47.399 12.953 48.535 7.504 49.047
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.313 0.106 0.320 0.057 0.319
Table 17j. First stage regressions
Table 6: Female BMI Table 7: Female BMI Table 8: Female BMI
First stage regression results
Endogenous
variable: number
of assets woman
has self/joint
ownership of
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: number
of self/joint
decisions over
purchase, sale, or
transfer of assets
made by woman
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: gender
parity gap (= 0 if
woman enjoys
gender parity,
“gap” if not)
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Pregnant (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.011 0.109 0.567 0.109 0.004 0.131
(0.132) (0.112) (0.876) (0.112) (0.020) (0.116)
Lactating (= 1, 0 otherwise) 0.193** 0.085 1.022* 0.085 0.011 0.086
(0.085) (0.073) (0.539) (0.073) (0.013) (0.074)
Age (in years) of member 0.069*** 0.016 0.578*** 0.016 0.009*** 0.017
(0.018) (0.014) (0.104) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014)
Age-squared of member 0.001*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education of
member
0.063*** 0.002 0.342*** 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.059) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009)
Household head is farmer
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.058 0.527*** 0.313 0.527*** 0.020** 0.522***
(0.065) (0.063) (0.434) (0.063) (0.008) (0.063)
Household head is trader
(= 1, 0 otherwise)
0.127 0.169*** 1.398** 0.169*** 0.027** 0.167**
(0.106) (0.065) (0.658) (0.065) (0.012) (0.066)
Household size 0.069** 0.061*** 0.585*** 0.061*** 0.010*** 0.062***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.144) (0.021) (0.003) (0.021)
Proportion of males
0–4 years old
0.407 0.726* 6.578** 0.726* 0.115* 0.729*
(0.495) (0.416) (2.992) (0.416) (0.069) (0.426)
Proportion of males
5–10 years old
0.572 0.458 6.479** 0.458 0.100* 0.462
(0.457) (0.367) (2.733) (0.367) (0.057) (0.376)
Proportion of males
11–18 years old
0.808* 0.166 7.532*** 0.166 0.094* 0.171
(0.440) (0.349) (2.696) (0.349) (0.055) (0.359)
Proportion of males
19–59 years old
0.169 0.022 0.141 0.022 0.024 0.016
(0.335) (0.259) (1.982) (0.259) (0.042) (0.269)
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Table 17j—Continued
Table 6: Female BMI Table 7: Female BMI Table 8: Female BMI
First stage regression results
Endogenous
variable: number
of assets woman
has self/joint
ownership of
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: number
of self/joint
decisions over
purchase, sale, or
transfer of assets
made by woman
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
Endogenous
variable: gender
parity gap (= 0 if
woman enjoys
gender parity,
“gap” if not)
Endogenous
variable: number
of food crops
produced by
household
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
Proportion of females 0–
4 years old
0.802 0.923** 5.817** 0.923** 0.047 0.927**
(0.496) (0.391) (2.949) (0.391) (0.066) (0.399)
Proportion of females 5–
10 years old
0.571 0.251 6.339** 0.251 0.144** 0.249
(0.457) (0.367) (2.686) (0.367) (0.057) (0.378)
Proportion of females 11–
18 years old
1.367*** 0.059 6.980** 0.059 0.143** 0.043
(0.465) (0.373) (2.768) (0.373) (0.058) (0.383)
Proportion of females 19–
59 years old
0.909 0.046 5.713* 0.046 0.085 0.046
(0.563) (0.427) (3.267) (0.427) (0.065) (0.437)
Proportion of females
60 years and older
1.197** 0.170 7.650** 0.170 0.101 0.166
(0.593) (0.464) (3.546) (0.464) (0.070) (0.475)
Ln (owned cultivable
land + 1)
0.012 0.017 0.387*** 0.017 0.006** 0.018
(0.019) (0.018) (0.126) (0.018) (0.002) (0.019)
Access to electricity (= 1, 0
otherwise)
0.150*** 0.020 1.064*** 0.020 0.010 0.024
(0.056) (0.048) (0.352) (0.048) (0.007) (0.049)
Price of rice (in taka) 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.009) (0.007) (0.056) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007)
Division level ﬁxed-eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of dairy cows
owned
0.111*** 0.142*** 0.749*** 0.142*** 0.005* 0.142***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.169) (0.029) (0.003) (0.029)
Owns hand tube well (= 1, 0
otherwise)
0.305*** 0.205*** 0.889** 0.205*** 0.041*** 0.197***
(0.068) (0.054) (0.397) (0.054) (0.008) (0.055)
Age diﬀerence (male–female) 0.012* 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.001* 0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.040) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Types of informal credit
sources in village
0.237*** 0.037** 1.524*** 0.037** 0.020*** 0.035**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.122) (0.014) (0.003) (0.015)
Whether female has
participated in any
community activity during
the previous year (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
0.058*** 0.034
(0.007) (0.046)
Clay-loam soil (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
0.062 0.403*** 1.519*** 0.403*** 0.012 0.396***
(0.068) (0.061) (0.431) (0.061) (0.009) (0.062)
Sandy-loam soil (= 1, 0 if
otherwise)
0.066 0.562*** 2.909*** 0.562*** 0.041*** 0.554***
(0.075) (0.071) (0.517) (0.071) (0.011) (0.071)
% of land irrigated by
household
0.002** 0.010*** 0.011** 0.010*** 0.000*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Number of community
activities woman has
participated in last year
Whether homestead land has
been inherited by woman
(= 1, 0 if otherwise)
0.373** 0.017 2.691*** 0.017
(0.156) (0.093) (0.974) (0.093)
Constant 0.965* 0.508 10.147*** 0.508 0.389*** 0.542
(0.552) (0.449) (3.252) (0.449) (0.077) (0.460)
Observations 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,203 3,203
F 15.813 47.597 18.908 47.597 11.771 47.399
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.319 0.188 0.319 0.121 0.313
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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